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Sn bject :- 
“ T I I E  BEST IVRY O F  ORGANISING AND MAIN- 
TAINING A RESERVE OF EFFICIENT BRITISH 
OFFICERS FOR T H E  BRITISH FORCES AT 
HOME AND IN INDIA, INCLUDING THE INDIAN 
ARMY .” 
B y  LieuLColonel  T B L F E R - S h I O L L E T T ,  late Wo7cesle.r 
Regiment. 
Motto :- 
a (  O V C ?  F07k o~C7.” 
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Conclusion 
I N T R O  DU CTI 0 ,N.  
IN a work entitled ‘!.The ,Army in 1906’’ the Right 
Honourablc H. .O. Arnold-Forster, h1 .P., after remarking that 
the supply of candidates for commissions in the Regular Army 
is sufficient to meet peace requirements, adds : “As regards the 
real need of the Army in’ war-the supply of available trained 
officers-the Armv is seriously, and, indeed, dangerously, 
short. . . .  l h e  shortage has been placed by some authori- 
ties as high as 6,000, including the supply of the Indian demand, 
which the Indian Government is now taking steps to meet to 
some extent. This is an extreme .figure; but in view of. the 
waste of officers in any war, and o f  th’e eFcessive waste in a war 
in’ which partially trainec troops are engaged, it would not be 
safe to reduce the total very greatly.” 
This estimate, it should be remembered, has been put for- 
ward by a statesman who,‘ when, Secretary of State for War ,  had 
the best professional advice in the Army at his command. 
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SECOXD PRIZE ESSAY. 61 I 
Startling as Nr. Arnold-Forster's figures at first sight ap- 
pear, it is significant that the Right .Honourable R. B. Haldane, 
his successor in  office, seems to have formed an even more serious 
view of the situation, for he is reported to have stated in the 
House of Commons on 25th February,, 1907, that on mobilisation 
no less than .4,000 additional officers would be required by. ,the 
Regular Army and G,ooo by the second line or Territorial Army, 
as the Auxiliary Forces are.apparent1y to be termed alter re- 
organisation, making 10,000 i n  al1.I 
AIr. Haldane may perhaps have had in his mind a more 
complete organisation for the latter than was contemplated by 
RIr. Arnold-Forster, necessitating an cnlarged demand for 
officers.. All such estimates, however, providing as they neces- 
sarily do, for the uncertain wastage of .war, must to some extent 
be hypothetical, and hence will be subject to variation; but in  
view of the fact that figures of: this magnitude are put forward 
by men holding positions of great responsibility, it is impossible 
to escape from the conclusion that a dangerous deficiency. of 
officers would become apparent if w e  were ever to be engaged in 
a war of any.magnitude. 
After advancing his estimate, Mr. Arnold-Forster propounds 
two questions : 
" How is this great-deficit to be made up?" 
" Or can it, in fact, be made up at'all?"' 
As the function of a Reserve of Oflicers would be in emer- 
gency. to meet'every deficit, it will be necessary- to make a n  
attempt to formulate a reply to'these.questions. 
ARRANGEMENT OF THE SUBJECT ADOPTED. 
I purpose in the following pages to divide the discksion 
of the subject int,o two parts. In the first of these will be set 
forth the defects i n  the'existing Reserve of Officers, described by 
Field-Rfarshal Earl Roberts, K.G.,' and other distinguished 
oficers in  their evidence before thc Royal Commission ap- 
pointed to enquire into the war. in.South Africa. This retro- 
spect will by ,no .means be of academjc..inte,rest qnly, for it ,is 
essential' that an conditions, which may Fave tended't0:produce 
inefficiency or &Ftculty-in the past should not be overlooked 
when formulating suggestions for the :Creation' of a reformed 
and reat,ly augmented reserve. & .is alm:osf certain 'also that Iioyver,;attfactive .the allure- 
ments field, out in  .ttiel'future to.young aspirants to' reserve;com-, 
missions, : yet the 'flow of 'the latter- would hardly, be so .ample 
as to.render it pdssible to dispense entire1y:Gith the services of 
1 As this .Essay"must'ncccssa~ly bc to sornc extent retrospcctivc, it 
has been convenient usually to cniploy ' thb . obsolete term I' Auxiliary 
Forces " whcn dealing with the Militia, Yeomanry, and Volunteers. Since 
the above was written i t  has been announced that the Militia, generally 
speaking, is to retain its individuality. 
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612 SECOND PRIZE ESSAY. 
the existing reservists,. most .'of whom are retired military men 
in receipt of small pensions. 
'Aloreover, the subaltcrns of a newly-constituted reserve 
might. not improbably on a general mobilisation be associated 
in dep6ts and provisional battalions to a considerable extent 
with the existing field officers and captains, and hence it is 
most desirable that these senior oflicers should be encouraged 
to set an example of proficiency to their younger colleagues. 
The  best means of promoting the zeal and efficiency, therefore, 
of the senior officers of thc rescrvc must be considered when 
making general proposals of reform.' 
A pikc is  will be given of the suggestions made before the 
South African \Var Commission with reference to the methods 
which might be adopted for enlarging and conferring increased 
efficiency on the Reservc,of Officers. 
The Reserve of Officers in India and the possible calls there: 
on will be dcscribed,' and the numbers available and !'required 
will be dealt with:- 
I shall conclude Part , I .  by briefly sketching the. systems 
in vogue in Germany, Japan, and more particularly in Switzer- 
land. 
By the light of facts and.  theories thus set: forth, and in 
some degree. codified, an attempt will be made in the second 
part to ascertain how.far it might be practicable to obtain under 
existing conditions a sufficient number of candidaies for the 
reserve without prejudice to,the Auxiliary Forces. The  possi- 
bility of 'applying any degree of compulsion in particular cases 
will be discussed; the difiiculties which at present exist in the 
way of obtaining additional reserve officers will be narrated, 
and the best means for overcoming these. difficulties will be 
examined in detail. 
The Colonies have been left out of consideration; as thcir 
resources would probably be exhausted in filling the 'commis- 
sioned 'ranks of their own military forces. 
PART I. 
THE EXISTING RESERVE OF OFFICERS AND THE DEFECTS WHICH 
BECAME ~ I A K I F E S T  WHEN THE RESERVE WAS CALLED OUT 
DURING THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA. 
The Reserve of Officers, according to the Army List, con- 
sists at the present time of about 2,300 individuals, leaving out 
of consideration, those above the rank of 1ieut.-colonel and also 
quartermasters and riding-masters. This rather formidable 
total, however, must not, be takcn as representing the available 
strength of the reserve. T h e  Royal Warrant for Pay, Pro- 
motion, and Retiremcnt of the Army " for rgo6, which contains 
~ ~~~~ 
1The Reserve of the Royal Army AIedical Corps would appear to be 
beyond the scope of this Essay, and has therefore not been dealt with. 
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SECOND PRIZE ESSAY. 613 
the regulations for the reserve, provides that officers can only 
be appointed thereto after retirement, whether from the Regular 
Army, Alilitia, Yeomanry, or Volunteers. 
Until recently, however, officers actually belonging to the 
Auxiliary Forces were permitted to accept commissions in the 
reserve in addition to their commissions in the former; and 
there are some hundreds of individuals included in  the reserve 
who at  the same time are still serving in  the Auxiliaiy Forces. 
These should not be counted twice over, and if they be deducted 
from the available strcngth, a s  well as those reserve oficers who 
are employed as chief constables, gpvernors of gaols, Colonial 
magistrates, etc., from which appointments they could not be 
spared, the total of 2,300 will be reduced to a little more than 
1,800. 
Nost reserve officers are middle-aged and many have en. 
dured hardships either on active service or in  unhealthy 
climates. I t  is reasonable to suppose, therdore, that the 
proportion of those medically unfit might be somewhat heavy- 
say 15 per cent. This latter deduction will bring down the 
effectives to from 1,500 to 1,600, and it seems probable that the 
reserve could not be counted on for any larger number. 
It will be desirable, for reasons already explained, to now 
give a summary of the opinions expressed before the South 
African JVar Commission with reference to the defects which 
became apparent in the present system on the only occasion o n  
which tlie officers have been recalled to the colours since the 
reserve was inaugurated in 1879. 
Field-Marshal Earl Roberts, ILG,, in tiis evidence before 
the South African War Commission, pointed out that the 
numerous additional officers who are required on the mobilisa- 
tion of an army should be chiefly subalterns; but that the exist- 
i n g  Reserve of Officers contained very few junior officers, and 
was principally composed of 1ieut.-colonels, majors, and captains. 
Major-General Sir Coleridge Grove, K.C.B., also explained 
that m’ost of the reserve are senior officers, or i f  not senior in 
rank, are usually no longer young men. IIence they are un- 
fitted by their age to be subalterns or junior captains. Many 
o f  them also have been out of the  Service for a long time, and 
are therefore more or less out of touch with the developments 
of military training and weapons, and have become unfamiliar 
with military law and routine. 
Field-Marshal Sir  Evelyn Wood, G.C.B., who was 
Adjutant-General of the War Office during the most acute crisis 
of the war in South Africa, informed thc Commission that he 
was perfectly satisfied from a mass of correspondence in his 
possession that the officers of thF reserve never contemplated 
being taken from their private business and compellcd to serve 
to their great financial detriment for three years with a dep6t 
or provisional battalion; that he had to call up men against 
their will, and that he received piteous appeals from individuals 
thus forced, who stated that by being compelled to leavc their 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
Q 
Li
bra
ry]
 at
 00
:13
 14
 M
arc
h 2
01
5 
614 SCCOSD P11IZt: I:ss'\\. 
work in civil life they were being ruined; that in some cases 
the \Var Office was obliged to threaten officers in receipt of 
retired pay, that if they n-ould not 'return to active service their 
pensions would be stopped. 
S i r  Evelyn IVood added that under such circumstances 
officers were not likely to work ivell, the more so as many of 
them had been alvay from military life for a great number of 
years. In'spitc of drastic measures in  compelling the services 
of reserve officers, the shortage became so marked, Sir  Evelyn 
Wood also told the Commission that one officer was obliged, 
without assistance of any kind, to pay, control, and, as far as 
lay in his power, to train about Sjo cavalry soldiers, half of 
whom were located at  Hounslow and the other half at  Aldershot. 
Referring to the lack of military knowledge on the part of 
reserve officers of artillery, Najor-General Sir G .  H. AIarshall, 
K.C.B., R.A., stated that they were usually so out of date that 
they were only of value for service at  dcpBts. 
General Sir  Ian Hamilton, K.C.B., remarked, in the course 
of his evidence, that a Regular officer who had left the Army 
because he was sick of it, and had bcen vegetating ever since, 
would not be likely to be very energetic or up to date when re- 
called to the colours. 
RECAPITULATION OF DEFECTS IN EXISTING RESERVE. 
I t  is obvious from the foregoing that the officers of the 
reserve, o n  the only occasion on which they have been recalled 
as  a body to the active list, failed in four particulars :- 
They were too senior in age and rank, there being 
hardly any subalterns amongst them, although the 
latter is the ronk of which the greatest number is 
required on mobilis a t '  ion. 
Their numbers were too small. 
I .  
2 .  
3. They were rusty in military Imowlcdge and were, 
generally speaking, out of touch with the Army. 
4. Many individuals when called upon .to rejoin, the 
colours responded to the call with a considefabl6 
lack of 'enthusiasm, and subsequently displayed a 
rather languid interest in their military duties. 
INFLUEXCES wi Ic11  COSTRIBUTED TO TIICSE DEFECTS. 
These defects will now be dealt with in detail, but it must 
not be lost sight of that on the outbreak of hostilities about 
300 members of the reserve at once volunteered tlicir services. 
These were accepted, and it is, I believe, a fact that, generally 
speaking, these enthusiasts rendered good service at home or 
abroad, and in many cases in very responsible positions through- 
out th'e continuance of the war. It sliould also be noted that a 
fair proportion of the above had kept their military knowledge 
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up to the mark at great personal expense in the preceding years 
of peace by serving with the Auxiliary Forces. It will be neces- 
sary later to recur to this particular point. I t  was only when 
an increased demand for officers rendered a general call to arms 
of reservists impcrative that the more grave of the defects men- 
tioned above became prominently apparent. 
The first of these, viz., the age and standing of the 
officers is, it is to be feared, inseparable from t h d  present 
system, for the immense majority of .the Reserve of Officers 
no\\’ serving are men who are compelled, as a condition of draw- 
ing a pension, or having accepted a gratuity, to serve in the 
reserve. Retired pay or a gratuity is not usually granted until 
an oficer has completed at least fifteen years’ service, .i.c., 
unt i l  he is 34 or 35 years of age, and liability to recall ceases 
at  45 for conipany officers and at 5 j  for field officers. \Ire are 
t l ius  confronted with the fact that with the exception of a few 
young men who join voluntarily (and who, as they usually hold 
rank af the same time both in the Auxiliary Forces and the re- 
serw, may not always be available for duty in connection yi th  
the latter), the Reserve of Officers is composed of individuals 
aged from 3 j  to 55,  i .c.,  far too old, in most cases, to discharge a 
subaltern’s duty with zeal. 
The  lack of subalterns and the difficulty which has been 
esperienced in inducing young men in large numbers to serve in 
that rank in the reserve naturally leads to the. second defect 
noted above, viz., 2, the comparative1 small effective strength 
of the reserve. 
influx of young blood, and a s  the best method of securing such 
an influx is the crus of the situation, its consideration must be 
reserved for the second part of this Essay. 
As .regards the third disability which attaches to the 
reserve otficers, to wit, their general want of military knowledge, 
it is submitted that this is easily removable by official edict under 
certain conditions, pecuniary and otherwise. 
As matters now stand, ‘once an officer ,of Regulars quits 
his regiment for the reserve, no real opportunity is, given him 
for keeping up his military knowledge, and hence, as years 
roll .by, Ii.is acquaintance, with military science becomes more 
and. more, foggy and out‘ of date; and all connection with the 
Army being seyered, many officers gradually lose their military 
inSti,nct entirely, ‘and eventually are led to regard themselves as 
civilians pure md’siniple., It is self-evident that a defect of 
this ltind might with young ,reservists drawn from c iv i l ,  life 
produce results even’ more unsatisfactory than those which were 
developed as \i-e have seen amongst ex-Army officers of middle 
age..: Lack of military knowledge and sentiment can only be 
overcome by the institution of “refresher courses,” which every 
reserve, oficer should be compelled or at, least encouraged from 
time to. time to pass through. 
As I shall explain later on, a system exists in most Conti- 
nental States under which reserve officers are obliged to rejoin 
I .  
As this defect can on r y be overcome by a large 
3 .  
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tlie colours periodically for instruction, and in the latter portion 
of this Essay the subject will be considered in detail. 
1 must now pass to the fourth defect, which, it is said, 
became manifest when the reserve was called out, viz., an oc- 
casional absence of zeal. 1 approach the subject with reluc- 
tance, knowing that 1 am treading On delicate ground, and 
would have altogether passed it by in  silence, i f  it had been 
possible so to do. 
I t  is hoped, however, that nothing that may be said in the 
course of this Essay will occasion the slightest annoyance or 
give offence in any way. 
It  will be gathered that many of the defects to which Sir  
Evelyn Wood and other officers testified, were not entirely at- 
tributable to any special peculiarity in the fersonnc2 of the re- 
serve in 1899, but might, not improbably, be esper,ienced even 
more acutely with an entirely different body of individuals, if 
steps were not taken in t ime of peace to guard against them. 
Any lack of zeal which may in some cases have been dis- 
played may, generally speaking, be ascribed either to mis- 
understandings with reference to the conditions of service ap- 
plicable to reserve officers, or to a belief that these were lacking 
in liberality or to the sudden and overwhelming character of 
a crisis for which nobody was prepared, and against which the 
regulations in  1899 were perhaps hardly framed to provide. 
It has been stated that reserve officers never believed that 
they would for months and years be taken away from their 
private business to perform military duty during the continuance 
of the war i n  South Africa, and hence they were not attuned 
to the self-sacrifice which was suddenly and unespectedly de- 
manded of them. The moral of this would appear to be that 
every means should be taken in peace time to keep reservists in 
touch with the Arniy, thus leading them to appreciate the fact 
that they are an integral portion of the Land Forces of the 
Crown. The lesson, however, by no means ends a t  this point. 
As misunderstanding as to conditions of service appears 10 
have exercised an influence antagonistic to ardour in 1Sgg-rgo2, 
some enquiry as  to the causes of any misapprehension which 
may have existed will not be out of place. 
In the course of the investigation, however, it will. be 
necessary to review some rather prosaic details, I t  is said, to 
quote one esample, that owing to a mistaken belief, that un- 
fortunately prevailed among certain reservists recalled to duty, 
the latter expected that they would be granted the full pay 
of their rank, in addition to their retired pay, and were much 
disappointed and discouraged in many cases at the very outset 
of their renewed military career because their remuneration was 
fixed by regulation at  the rate of only A150 a year, in addition 
to their pensions, witliout regard to the rank of each individual. 
The limits of this paper will not permit of a lengthy dis- 
sertation on controversial topics, but there are ceriain principles 
which may be broadly stated, and concerning which, it may be 
4. 
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remarked, that whilst some apply to retired military men only, 
the majority are applicable to all reserve officers alike. 
On the one hand, no soldier can be a l lowd to plead ignor- 
ance of the regulations. On the other hand, i t  is desirable that 
the rules which govern the conditions of service, of individuals 
who are civilians first and soldiers afterwards, and who can only 
devote a little t ime to the study of militarx subjects, should be 
as simple and obvious as possible, and withal as generous, as 
the surrounding circumstances will admit. IVithout doubt, 
retired pay is granted not only as  a reward for past service, 
but also as a retaining fee, to enable the State to claim a n  
officer’s service in emergency on advantageous terms for ;i 
certain number of years, and any annual grant \vhich may be 
given in future to a younger class of reservists will doubtless be 
regarded in a similar light. Certain factors, however, must 
be taken into account. I t  is well known that an unmarried sub- 
altern, in even the least espensive infantry regiment, cannot 
make both ends meet unless he is endowed with at least LIOO 
a year in addition to his military pay; whilst in the more ex- 
pensive infantry regiments ,and in the cavalry a far higher 
figure is necessary. 
Accepting the lowest possible estimate, however, it is evi- 
dent that it is impossible for an oficer to exist in the Army, 
even if entirely without any encumbrances and under ‘the most 
favourable conditions, with any less expenditure than A200 
a year. 
It would seem to be a matter for grave consideration, there- 
fore, whether it is expedient, in the public interests, to impose 
inevitable hardship, with its resulting discontent, by compelling 
men with perhaps families dependent on them to serve in an 
emergency for any less amount. There are other points which 
should by no means be overlooked in dealing with reservists, 
and upon ‘which it is therefore necessary to espatiate in an 
Essay treating with the subject. 
For example, it is customary to pay men called in suddenly 
and temporarily in  an emergency a higher wage than is given 
to workers whose services are permanently retained. 
Reserve officers are only called out to meet sudden or tem- 
porary emergencies, and i t  is a question, therefore, whether, as 
admittedly temporary workers they ought not to be treated when 
required with special liberality. Again, the reserve officers of 
the’future, the bulk of whom will be practically civilians, will 
engage in callings.in civil life to a much greater extent than 
those who were called upon in the crisis of 1899-1902. A 
summons to a r m s  renders it imperative on the part of a reserve 
officer that he should abandon any occupation in civil life with 
its accompanying emoluments, and might therefore be the means 
of ruining a promising career. 
To a man who has given hostages to fortune in the shape 
of a wife and family, such a necessity must in any case press 
heavily. It is not suggested for one moment that the State 
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can reasonably be called upon to compensate its servants for 
indirect loss, but it is submitted that if the necessities.of the 
State give rise to hardship, i t  is an unwise policy to accentuate 
such hardship by a lack of generosity. 
The zeal of some of the reserve officers called out during 
the Boer war was, we have been told, damped by financial 
dificulties occasioned. by their u-ithdrawal from occupations not 
military ; yet such dilliculties \vere undoubtedly mitigated by. 
the fact that .  the officers concerned were, generally speaking, 
retired military men, usually endowed with at least small private 
means, and also able to hypothecate a portion of their retired 
pay to their families. With the semi-civilians of a newly- 
constituted reserve their earnings in civil life would in most 
cases be their all, and on these ceasing on a prolonged term 
of military duty, it is to be feared that unless the State acted 
with generosity, those dependent o n .  the: departed ‘reservists 
might in some cases be left in pitiable plight, with results disas- 
trous alike to individual zeal and general efficiency. 
Such a state .of affairs may seem improbable in view of the 
liberal and patriotic course adopted by most employers towards 
those in their service who seven years ago proceeded on active 
duty to South Africa. I t  must not be forgotten, however, 
that there are hundreds, nay, thousands, of educated .young 
men of the best possible material for reserve oScerGbarristers, 
solicitors, accountants, etc.-who being, in the slang of the day, 
“on their own,” their incomes depend entirely on their personal 
and daily exertions. .It is submitted that if a reserve of 10,000 
efficient oficers is to be called. into existence, it will be necessary 
to keep in view the possible requirements and necessities of 
gentlemen thus placed. Officers of the reserve, who have not 
held commissioned rank in the Regular Forces, and who are not 
under the provisions of fornier Royal Warrants, holding com- 
missions i n  the reserve in addition l o  their commissions in the 
Auxiliary Forces, have always been requ.ired to undergo - an- 
nually a month’s training with a Regular unit at their own 
iespense; .. There w‘ere very few individuals thus qualified before 
the war, t.he. majority. of the reservists avaiIable . .being,, ‘as 
already stated,, es-Regular officers, who previous to r8gg had 
received no training whatever.from the date of their.withdrawa1 
from the Service perhaps ten or fifteen years previously. These 
officers were,in most,cases unfamiliar, not only with the weapons, 
equipment, .and syste,rn of drill, but also yith the method, of 
keeping military ‘accounts, which latter is altered.from time’ to  
time. . 
Any lack of knowledge as  to the system by which soldiers’ 
accounts are regulated may be the cause of great anxiety-and 
even pecuniary loss to the officer concerned, for i f  any mistake 
is made and public.money wasted thereby, the deficiency must 
be made good”out of the officer’s private resources. . Many 
reserve officers held the belief whilst the South African war was 
in  progress that however hard they worked, no recognition 
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would be accorded to them for their efforts in  the public 
service. 
This belief was, as the event proved, absolutely erroneous, 
for promotions were after the termination of hostilities bestowed 
on reserve officers on a generous scale; but if i t  had been p r b  
viously apparent that good service would thus by no means be 
overlo~licd, it is probable that zeal \vould have been considerably 
stimulated. 
T h e  seeming anomalies and small grievances which mili- 
tated against the efficiency of the reserve may have been and 
probably generally were apparent rather than real ; .and most 
of them might, in the light of cool reason and after-knowledge, 
appear trivial and even ridiculous. At the time, .howeve;. 
they no doubt created a feeling of soreness, and therefore tended 
to extinguish enthusiasm in the minds of men confronted by an 
a1 toget her .unexpected contingency. 
DESIRABLE THAT RESERVISTS SHOULD BE GENEROUSLY TREATED, 
AND THEIR CONDITIONS OF SERVICE FREE FROM AMBIGUITY. 
I ha\,e'dwclt'on this thorny subject \vith what I,.trust may 
not be regarded as undue insistence. I have .ventured to do so, 
not for the sake of unearthing grievances dead, buried, and 
forgotten, :but because' i t  seems 'probable that conditions of 
employment which, on the authority of Sir  Evelyn JVood, speak- 
ing as Adjutant-Genera1;'produced difficulty in the past, might, 
if unmodified, have a sirnilai result in, the future. 
' As explained by' Sir:Evelyn IVood, the majority of the re- 
serve ,oficers' with \+horn .he had to deal, could be controlled 
through their pensions; hiit the comparatively youthful reservists 
of the future will be practically civilians, controllable through 
their goodwill a'nd patriotism alone. If a sufficiently numerous 
and thoroughly efficient reserve is, i n  the absence of compulsory 
service, to be called into esistence; it will be an absolute essen- 
tial that 'the"public.pur&,Should be opened, and opened widely; 
and, further, that the conditions' of.service Sliould. be so detailed 
.and specified that misunderstanding by any reasonable being 
should be imppssible. 
Pre'cis OF SUGGESTIONS MADE BEFORE TIIE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR 
COMMISSION FOR RENDERING TYE RESERVE OF OFFICERS 
NORE NUMEROUS AND NORE FFICIENT. 
It will now be necessary, a t  the risk of being somewhat 
prolix, to give a f u l l  prkcis  of the opinions espressed by a 
number of distinguished officers to the South African W a r  
Commission. 
In .  commenting on a proposal, which will be described in 
detail later, for largely increasing the number of officers of 
the Regular Army, Field-hIarshal Earl Roberts expressed the 
opinion that in time of peace there would not be sufficient em- 
ployment for these estra officers. The  field-marshal added that 
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he would prefer to see a large number of officers passing through 
the Army into the reserve, rather than a permanent increase af 
those serving with the colours. He  approved of oficers going 
through courses of instruction, or otherwise usefully employed, 
being seconded, as in this way the number of officers actually 
serving with battalions and cavalry regiments would not be 
increased, but only the numbers of those passing through and 
available in war time. Lord Roberts appeared to think that i f  
a young man possessed good ability and was well educated he 
might, with one year’s training, learn enough military work 
to be of use as a reserve officer; and he stated that he would 
like to see some system inaugurated under which officers of 
Auxiliary Forces could be induced to serve, say, three months 
one year and sis weeks the nest, with the Regular Army, so as 
to enable them to master their military duties. 
These officers would receive pay when thus called out for 
duty, and together with some civilians, also trained as  officers, 
might be formed into a reserve. 
It might be necessary to grant a11 those included in such a 
category a retaining fee over and above the regularpay that 
they would be entitled to as,an inducement to them to be always 
ready when required. Under such an arrangement a certain 
number of officers would be thoroughly trained every year, and 
in the course of ten years a considerable body would be avail- 
able, not too’old to act as subalterns. In Lord Roberts’s 
opinion the supply of a sufficient number of trained officers was 
one of the greatest difficulties which the military authorities 
would have to face on the outbreak of war. I ‘  How reserve 
officers are to be obtained in sufficient numbers and with the 
requisite qualifications is, I confess,’’ said the field-marshal, 
‘ I  a problem which so far I have been unable to solve.” 
Lieut.-General Sir Ian Hamilton, in alluding to the diffi- 
culty in providing a Reserve of Officers, suggested that officers 
of the Regular Army should be permitted to go for a period of 
several years into the Militia as  seconded officers, keeping their 
places in .their regiments. IIe believed that such an arrange- 
ment might sometimes su i t  the private convenience of officers 
i f  their regiment were going abroad, and they had a family in 
a certain stage of existence, for i t  would enable them to serve 
with a Militia regiment on half pay whilst keeping their places 
in their own unit ,  so that they cduld return to the active list if 
they so desired after serving for a ,certain .period with the 
RI ili tia. 
“ ‘ S i r  Ian Hamilton kplained that .his suggestion would in- 
crease the total nu,mber of officers, as the places of those tern- 
poiarily attached to the Militia would of course be filled up in 
the Regular Army, and he further pointed out that this increase 
woul,d be effected in  a less costly way than i f  estra officers were 
kept on fu l l  pay ivith their Regular regiments. The idea 
that,  the Reserve of Officers .should be actually serving, i . e . ,  
that. the permanent establishment of the commissioned ranks 
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in the l<egular Army should be doubled, might be good from a 
purely military point of view, although it was doubtful whether 
so many estra olficers \vould have enough to do; but no country 
could stand the espense of keeping up full eflcctives for an 
emergency which might happen once in jo years. 
Sir  lan €Iamilton expressed the belief that to recruit the 
Reserve of Officers the authorities should tap an entirely new 
supply, such as the teachers in the secondary and elementary 
schools, many of whom are .very fond of practising a little 
military training with their boys. H e  had spoken to a certain 
number of masters on the subject, and it might be very easy 
for the IVar Office to enter into some arrangement with the 
Education Department by which teachers might be given some 
small estra reiiiuneration i f  they kept up a cadet company, 
and \\ere officers of it ,  and also undertook to go to Aldershot 
for two or three months to learn military work. 
They might be expected to gain an insight into the latter 
very quickly, being, generally speaking, clever men. Aloreover, 
in the discharge of his scholastic functions a schoolmaster 
necessarily gains two most important qualifications which every 
ofIicer should possess,. viz., the habit of enforcing discipline 
and the power of imparting knowledge. 
hlajor-General S i r  Coleridge Grove, K.C.B., was secretary 
to the Commander-in-Chief at  the outbreak of the war, and on 
him, therefore, the responsibility rested for the supply of officers 
durin a critical period. 
f i e  expressed an emphatic opinion, that unless our system 
is changed with regard to the commissioned ranks, we can never 
be prepared for any large extra demand, because an officcr is 
the one thing that i t  is absolutely impossible to improvise. !f 
he is to be of value in emergency he must have been trained 
beforehand; hence, in order to meet the demand on mobilisation, 
thcre should be some kind of reserve on which to draw. General 
Grove also explained that the existing Reserve of Officers is 
only useful up to a certain point. 
The  wastage of the war, the number of officers required on 
the lines of communication, for estra staff appointments, and 
for duty with Colonial Irregulars, produced such a demand 
that between 1st January, rgoo, and .midsummer, I ~ I ,  Sir  
Coleridge Grove had to provide over 3,000 officers in escess 
of the normal supply for the British Army. This did not 
include any officers for the Auxiliary Forces. H e  had to meet 
this demand from many directions; but in the first instance 
turned to the Militia and Volunteers, and commanding officers 
were requested to recommend their best men for appointment 
to the Regular Army, the result being that just at the time the 
hlilitia was embodied and stood i n  the greatest need, some of its 
most promising young officers were taken away. If the Militia 
and Volunteers are to be of value i n  the hour of need the reverse 
process should be possible, and they should be helped by having 
good Regular officers attached to them. The Auxiliary Forces 
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are always so short of officers that any drawing on them of 
the kind described is very severely felt. 
that the 
only way in which you can meet this difhculty is by’having 
ivith your various military units in peace n very large escess of 
the oficers that are absolutely required for duty connected with 
each unit. You must haw your reserve serving,, if I may 
use the espression ; you cannot let your ofiicer go back to civil 
life . . .’ and leave him there to forget what he knows; or 
i f  you do he \vill.not be as good as he ought to be when he is 
called up. You ought to have with all your Regular Forces at  
home.  . . . at least ;twice tlieit present establishment of 
officers, especially in the junior ranks. . . . At present I 
should say that this is tlie only \my I can see by which you 
can meet the very great demand there is for estra officers when- 
ever you are engaged in any war, and by which also you will 
be able to help the Auiiliary Forces. The fact of having this 
large number of bfficers at. home would enable a good many 
of them to be always away from their unit attending classes of 
instruction and obtaining certificates which would affect their 
after career, or with their affiliated Militia or Volunteers.” 
Sir  Coleridge Grove’s views, which, i f  carried out, would 
increase the establishment of the Regular Army by about 4,000 
officers, ,appear to have been shared ,to a large estent by Field- 
Marshal S i r  Evelyn Wood, G.C.B., and b General Sir Archi- 
whilst advocating an increase of six additional officers for each 
infantry unit.and three additional for each cavalry unit, es- 
plained that even such a n  increase of establishment would not 
in case of war be sufficient to provide for dep6ts and details at 
home. H e  also mentioned that a scheme had been under con- 
sideration by which young men not connected with the Service 
in any way would be provided with uniform, would be given 
a month’s training, and would then be passed into the Reserve 
of 0 fficers. 
Sir  Thomas Kelly-Kenny described this plan as a make- 
shift, but added that i t  was the least espensive that couTd be 
adopted. It might, however, injure the Ausiliary Forces, as a 
young man mi lit elect to join the reserve instead of the AIilitia, 
Major-General the Right IIonourable Lord‘ Chesliam, 
K.C.B.,’ pointed out, with special reference to  the Imperial 
Yeomanry, that colonels and squadron leaders should possess 
local influence, and be thus in a position to induce recruits 
to join the ranks. 
In some instances officers, thus endoH-ed might not be es- 
perts at training men in the short available time. It would be 
hard to bring an officer from outside, because .lie was more 
highly trained, over, the heads of men, who were doing good 
service in :recruiting, and L.ord’,Chesham therefore suggested 
that a number of supernumerary ofhers,  irrespective of rank, 
It appears to me,” added S i r  Coleridge Grove, 
bald I Iunter, K.C.B. General Sir  Thomas K elly-Kenny, G.C.B. 
Yeomanry, or e, olunteers. 
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should be allowed in each regiment; these would come out for 
training, and would constitute a Cavalry Reserve of Oficers. 
This reserve would be recruited from otlicers who had served 
in the Regular Army and had retired. 
H e  added that the question of rank keeps a great many 
officers out of the Yeomanry who would otherwise be very 
useful for training the men, and that retired officers should be 
allowed to join the Yeomanry in the rank which they held in 
the Regular Army. 
He believed that i f  such an  arrangement existed a captain 
would willingly perform a subaltern’s duty if he were called 
captain and merely attached to the Yeomanry. For example, an 
officer so placed would probably not object to command a troop, 
which is a subaltern’s position, and his so doing would greatly 
improve the training of some 25 men. 
hlajor-General Sir G. H. AIarshall, K.C.R., suggested that 
a reserve might be formed of officers \vho had left the Army 
comparatively early in life. These might be induced to join 
such a reserve by being allowed to wear their uniform and re- 
tain their rank, whilst their knowledge of Service matters might 
be kept abreast of the times i f  they were allowed to train with 
the Militia every year. S i r  G. H. hlarshall appeared to share 
Lord Chesham’s opinion that the officers in a category such 
as that suggested should return to the active list on mobilisation 
with the same rank in which they had retired from i t ;  and he 
believed that in war time. there would be little difficulty about 
rank, for he had known majors of artillery who had come back 
to duty.and been commanded by men who had been their sub- 
alterns, but no unpleasantness whatever had arisen in such 
cases. 
hlajor-General Borrett, C.B., who during the early stages 
of the war held t h e  position of Inspector-General of Auxiliary 
Forces, informed the Commission that so great was the shortage 
of officers that one regiment of Militia of two battalions, both 
of which .\\-ere embodied, had only eight subalterns instead of 
twenty-four, and quoted several other examples of a similar 
character. 
General Borrett’s evidence has an indirect but important 
bearing on the proposed increase of the Reserve of Officers 
owing to the fact that the cause to which he attributed the 
deficiency of officers of the Militia might operate also against 
the recruitment of the reserve. The General appeared to think 
that candidates were 1;ep.t back by the fear of out-of-pocket es- 
penscs, and very distinctly expressed the belief that the shortage 
of Militia officers was due to the fact that gentlemen’s sons had 
not so much money to spend as  in former days. 
hlajor-General Sir A. E.  Turner, K.C.B., R.A., at one 
time Inspector-General of Auxiliary Forces, shared the belief 
that the expense involved deterred young men from accepting 
commissions in the Auxiliary Forces. 
VOL. LI1. 2 s  
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’The Right Honourable St. John Brodrick stated that in 
consultation with Lord Roberts and other military authorities 
tie had formed the opinion that our regiments are already pretty 
fully oficered for peace time, and that it would be dinicult to 
find occupation for a large additional number of officers all the 
year round. hloreover, the cost would be very serious of 
adding a sufficient number of estra offcers to the Regular Army 
to meet all requirements on mobilisation. 
hlr.  Urodrick agreed with Sir Coleridge Grove’s estimate, 
that about 4,000 additional oficers would be required in a great 
emergency, and he added that a scheme for forming a reserve 
had been under consideration, under which commandinr officers 
of Regular un i t s  would be allowed to recommend young men 
who would be required to serve with the colours for six months 
or longer on leaving school. After this training, young men 
would enter their professions in civil life, but would remain 
ci la suite the regiment with which they had trained without 
further attendance for four or five years, and during that period 
they would have the privilege of wearing the uniform of the 
regiment, and in case of mobilisation they would be called up 
to the active list at once. 
hIr. Brodrick esplained that th i s  scheme had been sus- 
pendedifor the time being, as it  u a s  feared that such a system 
might attract young men to the reserve at the expense of the 
Militia and Volunteers. . T h e  right honourable gentleman 
further remarked, with reference to the difficult in getting a 
reserve: “ It is a very serious question. I think that it is one 
of the most difficult questions that we have to deal with.” 
It  will be gathered from the foregoing that expert opinion 
points emphatically to the conclusion that unless adequate 
provision against emergency be made in the quiet days of peace, 
embarrassment similar to that experienced during the South 
African war, but far more acute and dangerous, will be en- 
countered i f  we are ever unfortunately confronted by a first-class 
military Power. 
AIETHODS BY WHICH A SUPPLY OF TRAINED OFFICERS TO JlEm 
I t  is evident from the summaries of evidence quoted that 
tliere are two entirely distinct systems, the introduction of either 
of which might  be attempted with a view to providing a sufficient 
supply of officers to meet all possible emergencies. The first 
and perhaps simplest of these would consist in having the re- 
serve at all times actually serving; in other words, to so increase 
the number of officers of the Regular Army serving in the 
United Kingdom that on mobilisation every battalion, battery, 
or squadron would be able to spare enough officers to make up 
all deficiencies in the Ausiliary Forces and to furnish the extra 
men required with the Regular Army for transport, signalling, 
ammunition columns, special service, etc. 
sufficient number of officers for the Auxiliary 4 orces and the 
EMERGCXCIES hlIGIlT BE PROVIDED. 
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The second plan would be founded 'on an arrangement 
under which a number of young men would be passed through 
the Regular Army, their retention therewith being only sulli- 
ciently lengthy to enable them to get a fair knowledge of military 
work. 
After this period of training they would enter their pro- 
fessions in  civil life, holding themselves liable, however, during 
a certain number of years to recall to the colours in case of 
emergency. 
IVith regard to the first of these expedients, it should be 
remembered that on the whole service in the Regular Army is 
very popular with young men, and hence it is probable that the 
number of officers therein might be very greatly increased with- 
out very much difficulty, especially in the artillery and infantry, 
the cavalry being a more uncertain factor. Qloreover, if the 
reserve were always serving, a high standard of efficiency of 
the officers employed, even in an emergency, would be assured, 
for with all, military work would be the one occupation of their 
lives, and individuals permanently employed would necessarily 
be more thoroughly familiar with military matters than outsiders 
brought i n  suddenly from the  cares of civil life whose military 
knowledge would necessarily in many cases be somewhat super- 
ficial. There is ohe consideration, however, which weighs 
heavily in the balance against this plan, viz., the tremendous 
pecuniary burden which it would impose on the tax-payers. 
Even in the days when the enthusiasm aroused by the opera- 
tions in South Africa was still unabated, grave doubts as  to 
its feasibility were expressed, and now that the attention of the 
nation at large has forsaken military matters, and economy and 
retrenchment in the national armaments are the order of the 
day, it is almost impossible to conceive that any Government 
would have the courage in peace time to seriously propose the 
heavy addition to the Army Estimates which wquld be rendered 
necessary by the augmentation of the Regular Forces by 
thousands of additional officers. 
With reference to the second plan which has been men- 
tioned, viz., the training of a number of young men destined 
for callings in civil life by passing them quickly through the 
Army and requiring them afterwards to hold themselves liable 
for recal! in emergency, it is to be noted that some system of 
the kind is usually in force in other countries, and it is probable 
that i f  such an arrangement could be instituted on the right 
lines in the British Empire, a solution of the existing difficulty 
might have been found. Apart from the two principal systems 
indicated there are various schemes for minor reforms which 
might prove very valuable to a certain limited extent, and which, 
therefore, must not be lost sight of. 
In this latter class may be included the proposals that 
Regular officers should be allowed to serve for a few years with 
the Auxiliary Forces, receiving half pay and retaining their 
places in their own regiments whilst so doing, and also that 
2 s 2  
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officers quitting the Regular Army at  a comparatively early age 
should be encouraged to join units of the Auxiliary Forces as 
supernumeraries with their Army rank. 
The  suggestion advanced before the Commission, that for 
the Reserve of Officers the military authorities should tap an 
entirely frcsh supply, and should endeavour to enlist the services 
of, the masters of elementary and secondary schools, is most 
important and might have far-reaching advantages, which will 
be dwelt on later. 
THE INDIAN RESERVE OF OFFICERS. 
I t  will now be necessary to describe the existing Reserve 
of Officers in India, and to esplain how very far the number of 
officers available from this source is inadequate to meet eventu- 
alities. Officers who have entered the Indian Army since 
January, 1892, and have retired on a pension are liable to recall 
to duty in India. 
According to the Army List for January, 1907, the number 
included in this category only amounts to nine. 
The Indian Army Regulations also provide that the follow. 
i n g  officers and gentlemen may, if they so desire, be granted 
commissions in the Indian Army Reserve:- 
Officers who, having retired from the Indian Army, 
are not liable for further service. 
Officers who have retired from His Rlajesty’s other 
Regular Forces and are not liable to recall under 
W a r  Offce rules. 
a. 
b .  
c. Indian Volunteers. 
d. 
e. 
Officials other than military officers in the service of 
Private gentlemen residing i n  India. 
the Government of India. 
The inducements offered to gentlemen possessing any of 
the above qualifications do not appear to be sufficient to attract 
a large number of candidates, and the Indian Army List for 
April, 1907, contains the names of 12 lieutenants and 27 second- 
lieutenants serving voluntarily in the Reserve of Officers in 
India. These totals include both cavalry and infantry. The 
total reserve for India, therefore, apparently only musters 48 
oficers in all from every source. 
In an exceedingly able Essay, which was awarded in 1898 
tlie Gold Medal of the Royal United Service Institution of 
India, AIajor (now Brigadier-General) Rlullaly, C.B., R.E., 
arrives at the conclusion, as  a result of a very carefully-prepared 
calculation, that for the mobilisation of a force in India of only 
G o , m  men, at least 300 estra European officers would be im- 
mediately required, whilst a further z o o  would be necessary to 
make good the wastage of hostilities for one year. As matters 
stood nine years ago, therefore, at least 500 additional officers 
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would have been required to rnobilise and maintain for twelve 
months so small a force as 60,000 men. There are several 
factors in this matter which must be carefully weighed. 
On the one hand, since 1898 the number of European officers 
in uni t s  of the native army havc, generally speaking, been in- 
creased from g to 1 2 ;  moreover, a still further increase of estab- 
lishmcnt, calculated to add upwards of 300 additional European 
oficers to the Indian Army is in  pro ress. 
On the other hand, the wars in % outh Africa and in Alan- 
churia have thrown a lurid l ight  on the destructive power of 
the most modern weapons. The size of the armies engaged in 
the latter campaign has proved conclusively that if a serious 
attempt is ever made to invade India by a great military Power, 
not G0,ooo but five or six times that number at the very least 
will be necessary to frustrate the enterprise.' 
Lord Roberts reminded the South African War  Commis- 
sion that the Indian Army would require on mobilisation an 
even higher proportion of additional officers than the Home 
Army, because it is in India that the British officer suffers; and 
he added that in the event of the Indian Army being engaged 
in a big war it would certainly be necessary to send out a large 
number of officers from England. 
The  vital necessity of a sufficient supply of British officers 
for ensuring the efficiency of native troops is forcibly summarised 
by Brigadier-General hlullaly, who, after quoting in support 
the opinion of the late Field-RIarshal Sir  Patrick Grant, pro- 
ceeds: " The British officer is still and ever must  be the main- 
spring of our military organisation, the soul of our infantry, 
and unless a sufficient number be available when required, the 
object for which the Indian Army exists, viz., the defence and 
security of the Empire, cannot be held to rest on a secure 
basis." 
In view of these pronounccrnents it will be desirable to 
attempt to form a rough estimate of the drain on the corn- 
missioned ranks which might arise in the defence of the Indian 
Empire by the light of data gathered from South Africa and 
Manchuria. 
I t -  must be premised, however, that any estimate thus 
formed must be entirely approximate, for the difficulty of form- 
ing reliable deductions is greatly increased by certain conditions. 
For example, officers destined for duty with native troops must 
have special qualifications, which- will be described anon ; but 
generally speaking, about twelve only of the officers in a native 
unit would be Europeans, the rest being natives. Then, again, 
'for a big war in India a large number of complete units would 
certainly be despatched from home or from the Colonies, and 
these, as well as the European units quartered in India, would 
1 In a spccch in the Housc of Lords on 25th June, 1907, Lord Roberts 
is reported to have expressed sornc doubt as  to whether 300,000 rncn 
would suffice lor the defence of India. 
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have the deficiencies in their commissioned ranks made good 
from the Home Reserve of Ofiicers. 
The average strength of the Army during the South African 
war was about ~ 5 0 , 0 0 0 ,  and it is by no means improbable that a 
force even larger than this might be required for the defence 
of India. 
From the outbreak of hostilities in the autumn of 1899 to 
the conclusion of peace in May, 1902, i .e.,  for a period of about 
two and a half years, 1,072 regimental officers were killed in 
action or died from wounds or disease in South Africa, whilst 
1,851 were wounded. 
This by no means represents the total waste, for no less 
than 3,116 officers liere invalided home to England as a result 
of sickness or wounds.' 
If the number of deaths be added to the invalided we have 
the formidable total of 4,188, representing the total loss of 
officers in two and a half years-an average annual wastage of 
As already shown, in a native unit only two-fifths of the 
officers are European, and probably at  least one-half of any 
army which might be called upon to defend India would consist 
of native troops. 
The  casualties amongst European officers in an Anglo- 
Indian Army composed of half European troops and half of 
native, and numbering 300,000 men, would therefore amount, 
i f  only on exactly the same scale as  South Africa, and allowing 
for the comparatively small number of European officers with 
native units, to 3,500 in two and a half years, or, in round 
numbers, to 1,400 in one year. 
It must not be forgotten, however, that European officers, 
when leading native troops, would, generally speaking, be more 
conspicuous, and consequently more liable to be picked off by 
the enemy's marksmen than if they were in command of men 
of their own colour. Again, the availablc statistics from Alan- 
churia lead to the conclusion that in the campaigns of the future 
the loss in the commissioned ranks will be heavy, and probably 
twice as  high in proportion as with the rank and file. 
Thus a t  the battle of AIukden alone the total casualties 
among the Russian officeis amounted to 2#457, whilst the ag- 
gregate number killed, wounded, and missin in the course of 
the campaign only fell sixty short of 5,000. ?n addition, 3,474 
officers either died in  hospital or were invalided back to Russia? 
In view of these latter figures, it will be obvious that to 
allow 1,400 or 1,500 officers to replace the wastage of a year 
in a war waged for the defence of our Indian Empire would be 
to make an exceedingly moderate estimate. 
Previous to the augmentation of the European officers 
which has been effected during the last ten years, it was com- 
I J675' 
1 South African Despatches. 
2 Oficial statistics publishcd in thc Rirsski Itloalid. 
Cd. 990. 
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puted, as we have seen, that 300 additional officers would be 
required for 60,000 men mobilised on the frontiers of India, or 
a total of 1,500 for 300,000 men. If so large a force as 300,000 
men were ever to be thus massed, it would certainly contain 
many units sent direct from home, and these latter would, as 
previously explained, be completed from the Home Reserve of 
Officers. 
Still, whilst making every allowance for this fact, and for 
the recent increase in the commissioned ranks of the.  Indian 
Army, it is scarcely possible to conceive that a general mobilisa- 
tion of all the troops permanently quartered in India could be 
completed unless s o m e  goo or 1,000 extra officers were available 
on the spot. The large majority of these would probably be 
required for the lines of conimunications and other special work, 
in which they would have natives under their control. Of 
the 1,400 or 1,500 officers necessary to meet the first year’s 
wastage, about a third would be absorbed by native units. 
It would seem, therefore, that a Reserve for the native 
Indian Army could hardly be deemed efiective unless it mustered 
1,200 European oflicers at the lowest possible estimate. A11 
such estimates, however, as already stated, must necessarily be 
of the roughest character. Reserve officers, destined for duty 
with native troops, should be endowed with a Imowledge of the 
dialect spoken by their men, or of Hindustani, and thev should 
understand the native character and disposition. 
NUMBER OF RESERVE OFFICERS REQUIRED AND AVAILABLE. 
There are several difficulties which present themselves when 
any attempt is niade to formulate a definite and intelligible 
scheme for the creation of a Reserve of Officers. These, being 
inseparable froni the conditions of esistence of the Empire, must 
be confronted. 
The reserve cannot be homogeneous, for although all its 
members alike should have a knowledge of military work, yet 
for those destined for duty with the native regiments of India, 
the further qualification of familiarity with the native character 
iind language are deemed by experts to be essential. 
O n  the other hand, the possible demands of the Arm in 
India cannot be treated on a n  altogether separate basis 6om 
those of the I-Iome Army, for although special qualifications 
would be required in officers whose duty might lie with native 
troops; yet i t  would not be necessary that those intended for 
the augmentation of British uni t s  serving in India should be 
similarly equipped, and hence the latter might be drawn from 
the Home Reserve. 
The  fact that nearly 4,000 officers are required to complete 
the peace establishments of the Auxiliary Forces greatly com- 
plicates the situation. \\‘ere i t  not for this deficiency, not only 
would a smaller reserve be necessary, but also on mobilisation 
i t  would be possible to restrict the call on reserve officers to the 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
Q 
Li
bra
ry]
 at
 00
:13
 14
 M
arc
h 2
01
5 
630 SECOND PRIZE ESSAY. 
performance of their legitimate functions. As we have seen, 
these should be limited to providing the numbers of officers 
additional to the peace establishment required on mobilisation 
and to meeting the wastage of war. As matters now sTand, 
however, the reserve would be required on a general _call to 
arms to fill vacancies in peace establishments which in a normal 
state of affairs ought not, theoretically, to exist. 
The  Reserve of Officers, to be thoroughly effective, must 
be suficiently numerous to meet the tremendous strain which 
would arise in the by no means impossible contingency of a 
simultaneous mobilisation at home and in India. 
Briefly, therefore, in the event of n war with a great military 
Power the function of the reserve would be as folloi\:s:- 
I .  T o  provide the additional officers immediately re- 
quired on mobilisation for the Regular Army at 
home. Lord Roberts informed the Norfolk Com- 
mission that 2,000 would be necessary for this 
purpose . 
2. ‘To supply the wants on mobilisation of the European 
troops in India. 
3. To fill vacancies in the garrisons at Malta, Gibraltar, 
etc. 
4. To fill all vacancies in the Auxiliary Forces in the 
United Kingdom, amounting at the present time 
to between 3,000 and 4,000, and to provide the extra 
oficers required on mobilisation. 
5 .  To meet the wastage of war in the commissioned 
ranks which would arise during a year’s hostilities. 
The latter is rendered necessary by the fac?, ac- 
quiesced in by all authorities, that an oficer cannot 
be trained in less than twelve months, and hence 
that a clear year would be required for the instruc- 
tion of a new generation. On the Indian Army 
Reserve of Officers would devolve the task of meet- 
i n g  similar demands from the native army. 
When we consider that the present effective strength of the 
IIome Reserve cannot be placed much above 1,500, and that of 
the Indian Reserve stands at 48, it will at once be apparent that 
a great and dangerous deficiency exists in the commissioned 
ranks of the British Army. 
THE RESERVE OF OFFICERS IN GERMANY.’ 
It will now be desirable to sketch the organisation and 
system of training for reserve officers which prevail in foreign 
.countries, and I will deal in t h e  first instance with those of 
Germany. 
1 Compilcd from “ IIandbooli of the hlilitary Forces of Germany.” 
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T h e  outlines which follow will be of value, inasmuch as they 
will indicate the degree of training which is considered essential 
to maintain efficiency. At the same tinie it must be borne in 
mind that the bedrock of these systems is compulsion, and as 
this most potent agent a t  presents finds no place in the institu- 
tions of the United Kingdom, these descriptions must be re- 
garded to some extent as “ ospels of perfection,” which we can 
ditions will admit. 
Every German, escept the members of certain princely 
families, is liable to military service from 17 to 45 years of 
age: Young men, however, are not called upon to serve 
until they are 20. Their lives from 20 to 45 are divided, from 
a military point of view, as follows. In the Regular Army and 
its reserves from 2 0  to 27; in the 1st Levy of the Landwehr 
from 27 to 3 2  ; in the 2nd Levy of the Landwehr from 3 2  to 39; 
and in the Landsturm from 39 to 45. 
Young men who reach a certain standard of education and 
who engage to clothe, feed, equip, and in the mounted services 
to mount themselves, obtain the privilege of being transferred 
to the reserve after one year’s service insteaa of three, and are 
called “ one-year volunteers.” It is from this category that 
most reserve officers are obtained, although the reserve also 
contains a few retired officers of the Regular Army. 
An officcr of the reserve, after passing the necessary tests, 
is, generally speaking, compelled to serve therein from 21 to 
27, during which period he is liable to three trainings of from 
four to eight weeks each. 
A t  27, reserve officers can either be transferred to the 1st 
Levy of the Landwehr or can remain in the reserve until they 
have completed their whole period of military service. Between 
the ages of 27 and 32 they are liable to two trainings of from 
eight to fourteen days each. 
From 3 2  to 45, officers, whether of the reserve, the 2nd Levy 
of the Landtvehr, or of the Landsturm, may attend for training 
if they like, but they are not compelled to do so in time of 
peace. All officers, when undergoing periodical training, 
whether voluntary or otherwise, are granted the pay and allow- 
ance of the Regular Army. The rate of remuneration in the 
German Army is nominally less than in the British Army; but, 
as is well known, the German officer is very much better off, 
-pecuniarily, than his British confrere, his unavoidable expenses 
being far smaller. This point is of importance, as  showing 
that even when a Government is endowed with the power of 
applying compulsion to reserve officers, it may be considered 
expedient to treat the latter with reasonable liberality. 
THE RESERVE OF OFFICERS IN JAPAN.’ 
only hope to apply in so Ei a r  as the essentially differen’t’ con- 
“ One-year volunteers ” are encouraged in Japan on much 
If, however, a young man, the same lines as in Germany. 
1 Compiled from “ Handbook of the Military Forces of Japan.” 
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whilst possessing sufficient education to pass the necessary 
esaminations, is too poor to defray the cost of one year’s colour 
service, the State steps in and grants him pecuniary assistance. 
One-year volunteers receive a special military training, Gegin- 
ning at 2 0  years of age, and are primarily intended to provide 
oficers for the 1st and 2nd Reserves. 
In the 1st Reserve they remain for two years, and they then 
pass to the 2nd Reserve, in which they serve for a further 
eriod of five years; after this they may be transferred to the 
Rational Army, in which they remain unt i l  40 years of age, 
or in some cases to a much later age. The Reserve of Officers 
also includes a certain number of promoted non-commissioned 
officers who have passed the necessary esaminations. In  
peace time reserve officers are called out every two years for a 
training of five weeks’ duration. From this training, how- 
ever, are esempted Government officials \\ ho cannot be replaced 
and RIembers of Parliament during the Session. 
Officers of the reserve and of the National Army are pro- 
moted by selection. Since the war with China it is esteemed 
a great privilege to hold rank in the Reserve of Oficers in 
Japan. 
THE OFFICERS OF THE SWISS klRhlY.’ 
The Swiss Army is a hlilitia Force, based on the principle 
of universal Iiabilit r to military service. The  nature of the 
which would be required from reserve officers in this country 
if efficiency is to be maintained. 
Every Swiss citizen is liable to military service for a period 
of 25 years, beginning when he is 2 0  years of age. The exact 
duration of the period of t r a in ing  is at present under revision, 
but up to the present every man, whether destined for the com- 
missioned ranks or not, undergoes during his first year of 
service a recruit’s course, which, in the caw of the infantry 
has lasted for 45 days, in the cavalry for 80 days, and in the 
artillery for 5 j days. 
On the completion of his first year a man is passed to the 
Elite or Activc Army. If in the cavalry he has been compelled 
to go through a ten days’ course every year for ten years, whilst 
in the infantry and artillery the period of service has been twelve 
years with a compulsory training of sixteen and eighteen days 
in alternate years respectively. On  leaving the Elite, men pass 
to the Landwhr,  in which they complete their period of military 
service, being required to present tliemselves every fourth year 
for five or six days’ training. Officers are required to undergo 
the same courses of instruction as the men, but in addition are 
compelled to gain special proficiency by attendance at a series 
of extra courses, with the result that during an officer’s first 
service demanded r‘ rom the oficers thereof is similar to that 
1 Compilcd from “ Handbook of the S\vi>s .-\rniy.” 
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twelve years of service he has to perform military work on 440 
days in all. The demands made are very severe, the day's work 
frequently extending to as much as nine or even ten hours. 
I t  should be noted that the report of the Norfolk Commis- 
sion states that the training given to the Swiss officers may be 
taken a s  the minimum received in any country by the officers 
who form the framework of an Army." 
PART 11. 
DIFFICULTY I N ,  DEALIKG AT THE PRESENT TIME WITH THE 
QUESTION OF A RESERVE OF OFFICERS. 
A .  carefully prepared and most eshaustive scheme for the 
creation ol an efficient Reserve of Ofiicers has recently been 
placed before the pyblic.' 
!' I t  contains within itself the details necessary for the forma- 
tion, payment, and training of a wel1;organised reserve, and is 
the product of careful 'thought by some of the best brains in 
the kingdom, having a t  their' disposal sources of information 
which cannot be readily accessible to the world at large: . Under 
such circumstances any private individual can only approach 
,the subject iith.zi feeling, of considerable diffidence. RIoreover, 
as  the approved details of the new force are gradually unrolled, 
fresh features are disclosed, and the author of an Essay on. the 
formation of a Reserve of Officers writes in 1907, under the 
depressing consciousness, that his most carefully thought-out 
'plans may be anticipated by official edict before they see light, 
and that dearly cherished objects which he fondly believed to 
be entirely original may have been forestalled by other minds 
and embodied .in authoritative decrees before he has scarcely 
'put pen to paper. 
It is to be feared, therefore, that many of the suggestions 
which follow will inevitably appear to be somewhat belated. 
THE PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED. 
At a rough estimate some 10,000 reserve officers are, on the 
highest authority, now necessary for the national security. The  
existing reserve could hardly be. counted on for more than 1,500 
or 1,600 officers at  the outside; and we, are a t  once brought 
face to face with the fact that the services of some 8,500 young 
men are urgently required,: sufficiently educated and intelligent 
to be,  able to esercise ,command, sufficiently zealous to: master 
thoroughly the' rudiments 'a t  least of military art, sufficiently 
-self-denying to sacrifice periodically a portion of their leisure 
to, keeping up their military knowledge; arid suficiently patriotic 
'to 'face' the 'possibility-, of a call being made 'on their services 
which might, compel them tp suddenly abandon the vocation i n  
'civil life, by' yhich alone they could hope'to gratify their legiti- 
mate ambition Or even to 'earn their bread. 
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With all tl+ they must be endowed with robust constitu- 
tions, and must be content with a somewhat subordinate position 
in the military world. The manly instincts of the rising 
generation will doubtless render it possible for this call to be 
eventually met; nevertheless, i t  would probably be necessary 
to deal with such a corps of olficers, when formed, in a generous 
and sympathetic spirit i f  numbers as well as eficiency were to 
be maintained. 
RESPONSIUILITY WHICH ATTACHES TO A RESERVE OFFICER. 
The  attainment of a standard of military knowledge sufficient 
to qualify him as a leader of men is the first and most obvious, 
but by no means the most serious responsibility which attaches 
to a reserve officer. Looming behind, and far more grave in 
its possible incidence, is the obligation which he assumes of 
forsaking his vocation in civil life at a moment’s noticeeon a 
call to arms, even i f  his so doing may occasion the greatest 
distress, both to himself and to those dependent on him. It 
is beside the question to quote the analogy of any foreign 
country. If compulsory service exists, all have to bear a share 
in the national defence when danger threatens; all men of a 
certain age are situated and treated exactly alike, and the hard- 
ships of a sudden call to arms are divided equally amongst all, 
and there is no escape for the selfish and unpatriotic. ‘It is 
not difficult to realise the disastrous results which might accrue 
to a man of perhaps 27 or 28 years of abe who was mounting 
the lower rungs  of the ladder of success, and who was hurried 
away to military duty in an emergency and compelled to abandon 
the field in civil life to his more cautious or more unpatriotic 
competitors a h o  had declined in bygone years to assume the 
responsibilities of a commission in the reserve. 
To ensure the popularity of the Reserve of Oficers as a 
permanent institution in this  country, i t  is essential that the 
regulations governing the force should be framed, as far as may 
be, in such a manner as to ameliorate hardships of the kind 
contemplated. .To prevent misunderstandings also such regu- 
lations should be made subject to change as rarely as possible. 
How ANY HARDSHIP RESULTING FROM THIS RESPONSIBILITY 
It  will not be forgotten, that a t  the outbreak of the South 
African IVar, some hundreds of the existing Reserve of Officers 
a t  once proffered their services, which were accepted with 
advantage, both to the State and to the individual ; clearly show- 
ing that in any body of men there are a considerable number 
of .individuals whose circumstances in private life are such that 
a sudden summons to military dut inflicts no hardship upon 
the monotony of everyday life. Advantage might be taken of 
MIGHT BE ‘AMELIORATED. 
them, and is, on the contrary, we Y corned as a diversion from 
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this fact to divide the members of a newly-constituted reserve 
into two categoiies: the fi7s1 of these to be entirely composed 
of officers who had registered their names as being at all times 
willing to render military service. In the ~ C C O J ~ ~  calcgo7y 
might be included those who, whilst joining the reserve in 
fulfilment of a moral debt due to their country, were so situated 
that prolonged duty with the colours could only be undertaken 
at great personal loss or inconvenience. Under such a system 
the first brunt of a call to arms would devolve on those who 
were best qualified to bear it. Officers in the fils1 cnlego.ry 
would be the first to rejoin the Army, and would be the last to 
quit the active list, on the conclusion of hostilities. 
The strength of a reserve, it must  be remembered, should 
be sufficient, both for the needs of a general mobilisation at 
home and abroad, and for the wastage of twelve months of 
warfare. 
If the mobilisation were only partial, or i f  the campaign 
were only brief, it is possible that the requirements of the 
situation might be met to a great extent by the officers of the 
fils1 catcgoiy of the reserve, and those in  the second calegbry 
might thus be spared, or at least afforded breathing space, to 
put their affairs in civil life in order. Transfers from one 
category to the other should be permitted. 
To the wives and children of all non-commissioned officers 
and men of the reserve, what. is termed as a l 1  separation allow- 
ance ” is granted during the whole period that the husband and 
father is compelled to absent himself from his family for military 
duty. 
The concession of a similar boon to the wives and children 
of reserve officers would appear to be but equitable, and such 
a concession, if on a sufficiently generous scale, might be the 
means of,averting much hardship and even misery from helpless 
ladies and children. The want of some provision of the kind 
made itself felt to a limited estent between the years 1899 and 
1902. The reserve officers then called out, however, were able, 
for reasons which I have before dwelt upon, to make some pro- 
vision at  least for their families, with the result that the latter, 
though in many cases not left in very opulent circumstances, 
were at least shielded from penury. I t  was fully explained also, 
in the first part of this essay, that pecuniary limitations might 
attach to the reserve subalterns of the future, which would, i f  
the latter were required for a prolonged term of military duty, 
render official provision for their wives and families necessary, 
or, at any rate, most desirable. Lastly, if any reserve officer, 
not entitled to retired pay, were to be compulsorily retained on 
military duty, for such an extended period that his career in 
civil life might have been seriously compromised, it would 
appear to be just that he should be accorded the option of 
permanent employment in the Regular Army ; being appointed 
to the latter, not necessarily to the rank of second-lieutenant, 
but to the same rank that he had held in  the reserve. 
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THE CLASSES FROM w i w 1  RESERVE OFFICERS MIGHT BE DRAWN. 
It has.hitherto been generally recognised that every aspirant 
to a commission, whether in the Regular or in the Auxiliary 
Forces, must be sulticiently pecuniarily endowed, to enable 
him to be out-of-pocket, as a result of his connection with the 
army, without financial disaster. In other words, the .scale of 
pay and allowances has been based on the assumption that 
these will be considerably supplemented by the private means 
of each officer. 
In vie\\. of the enormous deficiency which now exists, it 
\i-ould seem to be a matter for grave consideration whether this 
time-honoured tradition can possibly be adhered to, in the case 
of the Reserve of Officers, i f  an adequate number of young 
men are to be attracted thereto. In his evidence before the 
South African W a r  Commission, General Sir  Ian Hamilton, 
as previously narrated, esprcssed the conviction that for the 
Reserve of Officers we ought to tap an entirely new supply. 
H e  added that, as a result of enquiries amongst a certain 
number of masters of secondary and elementary schools, i t  had 
struck him that i f  some' h a l l  remuneration were granted, 
many of these gentlemen might ,be induced to qualify them- 
selves in military knowledge, and might be of great use in case 
of emergency as  reserve officers. 
Elementary schoolmasters would, a5 a body, have special 
facilities for acquiring military knowledge. Admirably 
organised Volunteer compinies are a feature in many of the 
Training Colleges, in which they are prepared for the scholastic 
profession; and several of these have exhibited a very high 
degree of proficiency in competitions, which are open to units 
of the Volunteer Force. 
The scheme recently promulgated by the W a r  Office 
provides that, on the Continental standard, each reserve officer 
should have military instruction for one year before being 
granted his commission, the period being the same, whether 
for the cavalry, artillery, or infantry; but a step further is taken, 
and it is officially suggested that i f  a youth has done well for 
two years in the Cadet Corps of any public school, such as 
Eton, or Harrow, he will be excused four months out of the 
tN-elve months' instruction to which he would be liable, before 
being eligible for the reserve; moreover, if he proceeds to a 
University, and gives a further two years' service in the 
University Volunteers, and obtains the requisite certificate, the 
year's military t ra ining necessary to qualify him for the reserve 
will be still further reduced by four months, making a total 
reduction of eight months, for service in school Cadet Corps and 
University Volunteer Corps. These uni ts  will practically be 
converted into training schools for candidates for the reserve ; 
and the school and university authorities will apparently be 
granted subsidies, to enable them to provide instruction in the 
military art, as an addition to the regular curriculum. 
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The extension of some adaptation of this system to the 
training colleges for elementary and secondary schoolmasters 
would be but a slight advance on the reforms already officially 
approved, and lvould open up an entirely new source, from 
which reserve officers might be drawn. 
In niany elementary schools, Boys' Brigades or Cadet 
Corps are in esistence; and where this is the case the masters 
have every facility for keeping up their Itnowledge of drill and 
tactics, whilst the daily routine of maintaining discipline and 
imparting instruction during school hours must unquestionably 
tend to qualify them to esercise command. 
The one and only obstacle which esisls to the general 
application of the system indicated, lies in the deplorable dislike 
and distrust of things military, which still lingers in some 
localities, and which, i f  special precautions were not taken, 
might be engineered to the detrinient of m y  master who held a 
commission. Such short-sighted intolerance could only be 
gradually eradicated by the inclusion .of the principles of 
patriotism in  the syllabus of instruction of every school in the 
land. 
The  extension of the field of recruitment for the Reserve of 
Oficers should not, however, be limited to schoolmasters alone. 
If the reserve is to be raised to, and permanently maintained 
at, an establishment of ~o,ooo, and efficiency is to be insisted 
upon, it is almost certain that the official net will require to 
be widely spread, and no possible source from which candidates 
might be drawn should be neglected. 
The officers of the British Army have hitherto, generally 
speaking, sprung from families of a certain social status, and 
in view of the splendid services which have been rendered in the 
past by men thus obtained, there is a reluctance in many quarters 
to the introduction into the commissioned ranks of a novel 
element. I t  can scarcely be espected, however, that a demand, 
not for hundreds, but for thousands of additional officers, can be 
met from what is after all a very limited class; and it is to be 
noted that even in countries in which compulsion is resorted 
to, it has been found impossible to obtain reserve officers entirely 
from the higher social strata. 
There is in the United Kingdom a large and intelligent 
middle cl-the young men of which dre to be met with 
neither amongst the officers nor amongst the rank and file of the 
Army, the Yeomanry, and the AIilitia, and who have only been 
attracted to the Volunteers to an exceedingly limited extent. 
Many of Napoleon's most brilliant leaders were sprung 
from this middle class, and if the regulations for the reserve 
were made sufficiently attractive and sufficiently comprehensive 
it is submitted that in this country a largc number of reserve 
officers might be drawn from it with great advantage, both to 
the State and to themselves. 
Young men of this social grade have hitherto, as a body, 
held aloof from the military forces of the Empire, partly.from 
I shall recur to this subject at  greater length. 
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fear of the expense in which they might be involved, partly 
from a natural dislike to p lunging  into an unknown world, 
amongst associates with whom they might have little in common, 
and partly from the strong prejudice against the Army, which 
still lingers in the minds of many estimable people who are to 
be found in the middle classes. If any considerable number 
of young men could be drawn into the Reserve of Officers from 
the latter source, two distinct objects would have been attained. 
The first, that the number of vacancies would, of course, be 
reduced; the second, and far more important, that an inroad 
would have been made into the citadel of that prejudice against 
the Profession of Arms which has reacted injuriously on the 
national interests in  the past, and which, i f  unchecked, may 
bring disaster in the future. To accomplish the object pro- 
posed, every eliort should be made to establish Volunteer Corps 
where none now exist in all technical, engineering, agricultural 
and science and art colleges, and every facility and financial en- 
couragement should be given to the students at  these establish- 
ments to qualify themselves for the reserve on the lines which 
have been suggested for the undergraduates a t  the universities. 
It  will be remembered that General Sir  Thomas Kelly- 
Kenny, the Right IIonourable St. John Brodrick, and other 
witnesses before the Commission, pointed out that the tendency 
of a Reserve of Officers might be to attract candidates from the 
Auxiliary Forces, and thus, so to speak, ‘‘ to rob Peter to pay 
Paul.” If, however, as  above suggested, an entirely fresh 
source could be opened for the recruitment of the reserve, the 
existence of the latter could not be detrimental to the other 
branches of the Service, and a very serious difficulty would have 
been removed from the path of military reformers. 
Distinguished authorities have advocated various minor 
measures calculated to augment the reserve, or at any rate, to 
add to the total number of available officers. 
For example, officers who have quitted the Service so early 
in life that they have not been entitled to any retiring allowance, 
and hence cannot be compelled to join the reserve, might be in- 
duced to do so voluntarily, if it were open to them to be attached 
as supernumeraries to uni t s  of the Ausiliary Forces in ttie same 
rank as that which they held in the Regular Army, and they 
were granted a small retaining fee, in addition to the usual 
allowance for camp, for every year that they did duty with the 
Auxiliary Forces, and thus kept their knowledge up to date and 
held themselves liable as reserve officers. Again, officers of the 
Regular Army might be permitted to serve for a limited number 
of years with the Ausiliary Forces, receiving half only of their 
military pay whilst so doing, but retaining their positions as  
supernumeraries in the Regular un i t s  to which they belong, 
and being permitted, i f  they wish, to return to the Regular 
Army on the expiration of their period of service with the 
Militia or with the Territorial Army, into which the present 
Yeomanry and Volunteers, together with a few u n i t s  of the 
Militia, are eventually to be moulded. 
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A limited number. of. very useful. recruits might be selected 
from amongst the pensioned warrant and non-commissioned 
officers of the Regular Army. 
The  only fault of these men is one which they share with 
the retired commissioned officers who compose the majority of 
the existing reserve, viz., they are usually middle-aged, and 
hence would be rather unsuited for the duties of subalterns. 
On the other hand, officers drawn from this class .would be 
valuable in positions of special responsibility, and i f  a slight 
increase were to be made in the pension of any warrant officer 
or sergeant who was selected for a reserve commission, and 
who had served in the Reserve of Officers for a certain number 
of years, i t  is probable that many of them would gladly join. 
It will now be well to consider the possibility of bringing 
any form of judicious pressure to bear in the case of certain 
members of the community. 
THE POSSIBILITY OF APPLYING COMPULSION I  SPECIAL CASES. 
Many hundreds of well, and indeed highly, educated young 
men are employed in the various Government offices . .  both in 
London and the provinces. 
I t  has been suggested that, inasmuch as  they are the servants 
of the public, and are not, generally speaking, overworked, it 
would be no undue interference with the liberty of the subject if 
they mere required to occupy a small portion of their leisure in 
military training; and the advocates of this limited .form of 
compulsion point out that the Reserve of Officers mi ht afford a 
of the kind yould have a chance of 'acceptance unless it met 
with the approval of the majority.of the senior members of the 
Ciyil Service, and it is impossible for any private individual to 
gauge the sentiments of these latter gentlemen. 
Against the proposition' i t '  might be urged' that in times 
of national danger and excitement the services of all officials 
in the Government departments would ' most probably be re- 
quired to meet the increased strain' khich'  might be thrown on 
the civil 'administration of the kingdom; in favour of it, it  
might be remarked,, that i f  a hostile raiding force had landed 
anywhere 'on our shores, those of the general public who are 
in the habit of inundating the authorities with a ceaseless flow of 
questions would have their thoughts too fully occupied'to be able 
to propound conundrums as to' the amount of their income-tax 
or the miscarria e of their letters, and hence that the clerical 
a national crisis. 
The most 'fatal objection probably which could be made 
against compelling Civil Service clerks to -join the reserve 
would be' that i t  would be rather arbitrary to single out one 
class alone as objects of a form of compulsory service from 
which' all their fellow citizens would be esempt. 
most appropriate sphere for these young men. ' If o proposal 
w-ork in many o B the departments might be greatly reduced in 
VOL. LII. 2 T  
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There is another means, however, by which the gentlcmen 
referred to might be encouraged to accept commissions. 
Admission to the Civil Service is gained by undergoing 
certain examinations, in which each candidate must obtain, in 
order to ensure success, a high standard of eficiency in certain 
specified subjects. 
Now, without exercising the slightest compulsion in the 
matter, it would be open to the Government to ordain that 
military drill and tactics were to be considered as one of the sub- 
jects that might be taken u p  for entrance to any public office; 
and, further, that aspirants who had passed the necessary esami- 
nations to qualify for the rank of second lieutenant of the reserve 
should be credited with the marks gained therein when their 
places .in the Civil Service entrance examinations \\ere tieing 
determined. 
TIIE RESERVE OF OFFICERS FOR INDIA. 
The Army Regulations for India provide that officials, other 
than military officers,;in the service of the Government of India 
may be enrolled 'in the Indian Reserve of Officers, but. no 
special inducement to join has been, held out, and no attempt 
whatever has,apparently been made to bring pressure to bear 
on these gentlemen. 
There arc reasons which would seem to render it specially 
dcsirable'that Civil Servants in  India should have some military 
training. ' They are surrounded by -an enormous alien pop& 
tion, differing in every conceivable way from themselves in 
religion, colour, and habits. The  rule of Great Britain in 
India has been defined as 'a benevorent despotism, having in 
reserve the power of the sword. It would seem not inappropriate, 
therefore,' that those who administered British rule under these 
conditions, although civilians in time of peace and under 
all ordinary circumstances, should .yet be endowed with some 
military training and esperience; There are 'some strong 
arguments against this theory, which have been ably .\voiced 
by Brigadier-General hIullaty in the essay already. referred :to, 
wherein he points out that in the evcnt of a serious attack being 
made on India, the Civil Servants of the Crown would be " the 
individuals whose discretion may stem a rising flood of revolt, 
calculated to hamper' the armies in the field, and who will have 
to give the first warnings which will enable the storm to be 
weathered; hence the Civil Officer who is trained to govern thc 
people and to discover first symptoms of discontent will be more 
profitably emplo ed in performing his legitimate functions than 
Against this view, which'no doubt i s  weightily supported, it 
may be urged that as a Reserve of Officers sh%uld be principally 
composed of 'young men, only the most junior Civil Officials 
in more'or less subordinate positions could find a place therein; 
and, further, that as a 'matter of fact many civilians in the 
in taking up un Y amiliar and subordinate duties in the field." 
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Government service were employed in purely military duties 
in the critical days of the Mutiny. 
To quote one out of many esamples of this, Colonel RIalli- 
son records in “ T h e  Indian hlutiny” that hlr.  R. 11. \V. 
Dunlop, Alagistratc and Collector at  hlirath, organised a volun- 
teer troop of cavalry from the European refugees at that station, 
and so actively did he proceed with the mounting, drilling, and 
arming that the troop was ready for duty in a very short time, 
and afterwards rendered good service in the field. 
Splendid as were the deeds of this kind rendered by Indian 
civilians in A11 parts of the affected area, it is difficult not to 
believe. that they might have been even. more effective if all 
such officials had been subjected to military. training for a few 
months o n  their entrance to the public service, and had been 
compelled to keep their Itnowledge u p  to date during the first 
few years of their oficial life by means of refresher courses’’ 
of instruction. 
With the Indian, as  with the IIomc Civil Service, no pro- 
ject for compelling the junior members to become reserve oficers 
would *have a chance of success unless the approval and co- 
operation of their. seniors !lad been obtained, and the .vital 
question whether such co-operation would be forthcoming or 
not could alone bc answered in response to official enquiries. 
I t  is submitted, however, that the possibility of a little gentle 
pressure being applied to Government officials in India as well 
a s  at home ought not to be forgotten i f  other expedients for 
fillin 
!?here remains to be considered the feasibility of obtaining 
a certain nuhber of recruit oficers from amongst the private 
individuals located in India : lawyers, merchants, tea planters, 
and so on.  Gentlemen thus employed are eligible under the 
Indian Regulations for appointment to the reserve; but few of 
them appear to have accepted service therein, and no determined 
effort appears hitherto to have been made to attract them. I t  
is possible, ho\vever, i f  advantageous terms were offered to all 
such gentlemen on the lines which will be suggested presently 
for the IIomct Reserve, that a certain number might be en- 
couraged to qualify themselves. A proportion of the private 
gentlemen living in India may have passed through school or 
university Volunteer corps before quitting their native land, 
and hence it might be possible to substantially reduce in -many 
cases the fu l l  period of military training necessary for a reserve 
officer on the system already briefly described, and nliich has 
beer1 officially approved in principle for the Home Reserve. 
Both Government officials and private individuals l iving in 
India would understand the native character and language, and 
with military training would be eminently qualified to lead 
native troops. It is hardly possible to conceive, however, that 
they would be ayailable i tnde7 cnliiely 2roZzinInry condilions i n  
sufficient strength to meet all the requirements of the Native 
Army, both for a general niobilisation and for a year’s hostilities, 
the reserve should prove incflective. 
2 T 2  
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and the project for the completion of the necessary number, 
which in the existing state of affairs ofiers most prospect of 
success, is to allow a limited number of junior olficers serving in  
European uni ts  of cavalry and infantry in India to be attached 
to native uni t s  of the same arm for a period of a few months, 
granting them the extra allou-ances of the Indian Army as an 
inducement to volunteer during the period that they were 
attached 
A certain percentage of officers of European regiments 
would thus be enabled to gain some experience of the interior 
economy of a native unit and of the language and caste prejudices 
of the native soldiers. Such officers would, after being initiated 
into these details, rejoin their own units; but they would be 
regarded as a reserve for the Native Army, and would as far 
as possible be each ear-marked for the particular native battalion 
or cavalry regiment to which they had been attached for instruc- 
tion. In fact, if this system were thoroughly established, the 
Reserve of Officers for the native troops would in time of peace 
be actually serving with the European troops in India. 'l'herc 
are about Go infantry and cavalry un i t s  quartered there, and if 
five or six subalterns or junior captains in each had thus 
qualified there would be from 300 to 400 available. 
The weak point of any plan of this kind would be that on 
mobilisation the commissioned ranks of the European units in 
India would be depleted by the requirements of the Native Army 
jus t  a t  the very moment when the need for the services of all 
officers would be most acutely felt as much with European 
as with native troops. 
This constitutes a grave blot in  such a system and might 
produce great inconvenience i f  not carefully guarded against. 
The only possible means of providing against the evil- 
and the remedy would be but partial-would be to have a corres- 
ponding number of officers at home ear-marked for the European 
units in India, and ready to embark for duty in India at any 
time with a few hours' notice. 
Such officers would form a special section of that first 
category of reserve officers a t  home, the formation of which has 
been already advocated, and which would be composed of 
officers selected for inclusion therein on the ground that they 
would be willing to hold themselves at all times ready for 
military duty at  short notice. 
The most weighty argument which can be adduced in favour 
of the scheme outlined above is that it is the only one that 
promises the slightest prospect, as matters now stand, of attain- 
ing the object in view and raising the Indian Reserve of Oficers 
to some approach to the requisite standard of numbers and 
efficiency. It appears at best, however, to be in the na'ture of a 
makeshift, and it would seem not improbable that the only 
true solution of the difliculty would be to recruit to the Indian 
Reserve of Officers by some means all young men joining 
either the Civil Service, the Public Works Department, the 
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Policc, or the Forest.Departmcni, and to retain them in the 
reserve for a certain limited number of years after their entry 
into the public Service, their military liability, however,, being 
brought to a close before any position of serious responsibility 
could have been attained in civil official life. 
THE AMOUNT OF TRAINING NECESSARY FOR EFFICIEXCY. 
The demands made upon reserve officers in Germany and 
Japan have already been esplained, and are typical of those 
imposed by all the great military Powers. 
To recapitulate, a year’s service in the ranks as a “one-year 
volunteer ” is followed by the imposition of certain tests in 
technical knowledge, and i f  these are surmounted by the candi- 
date he is appointed a subaltern of the reserve. H e  is then 
permitted to follow his vocation in civil life, but his Icnowledge 
of military matters is not allowed to rust, and he is compelled 
to present himself for training periodically. The duration of 
these “ refresher courses,’’ as they are sometimes termed, and 
the frequency with which they have to be undergone vary in 
different countries ; but, speaking generally, they are biennial 
during the first few years of a reserve officer’s service, and 
vary in length from one to two months, whilst both the fre- 
quency and duration of these courses are reduced as the reservist 
advances in years, until at  a certain age-usually about 32- 
they cease to be compulsory, the older men being nevertheless 
encouraged to keep their knowledge abreast of the times, and 
being afforded facilities for so doing until their liability to 
military service comes to an end, i .e . ,  usually until they are from 
45 to 5 j  years of age. 
In Switzerland the system is in many respects unique; the 
so-called Regular Army or Elite closely resembling in the 
conditions of service the Militia or Landwehr of other countries. 
Even under this modified system, as we have seen, each 
officer has to perform military duty between the ages of 20 and 
32 on no less than 440 days. I t  u-ill be remembered that the 
amount of training required from a Swiss officer appears to have 
been regarded by the Norfolk Commission as the minimum 
consistent with efllciency. 
I t  will now be necessary to carefully consider how nearly i t  
might be possible in this country to approximate to the standards 
above described. I t  is hardly necessary to remark that it is 
most desirable that the conditions under which military training 
is imparted to reservists, whilst aiming at  thorough efficiency, 
sliould yet be so moulded as to interfere as little as possible 
with the work in civil life of individual officers. 
Even the powerful lever of compulsory service will not 
necessarily produce efficiency amongst reserve officers, unless 
the system under which their military knowledge is first 
imparted, and afterwards kept up-to-date, is carefully graduated 
and intelligently carried out. 
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Previous to the war between Russia and Japan, the Russian 
reserve officers were not only deficient in numbers, but were 
also, in many cascs, lacking in technical knowledge and general 
education, the method of instruction having been radically 
defective, and the system of “Refresher Courses” intermittent, 
and, in  some cases, non-existent. 
As a result, many officers were found to be wanting in 
military spirit, and showed the greatest repugnance to re-joining 
the colours; the lack of discipline thus displayed being the 
cause -of much difficulty and friction. 
CONDITIONS UNDER WIICII  THE REQUIRED TRAINING MIGIIT BE 
IMPARTED TO SULIALTLRNS OF THE RESERVE. 
There seems to be every probability that in this country, as 
with the Continental Powers, and with Japan, twelve months’ 
training will be demanded from every candidate for the Reserve 
of Officers. 
Good service in School and University Volunteer Corps, 
however, will probably be accepted in lieu of eight months out 
of the twelve, and hence the period to be spent with the Regular 
Army as a preliminary to obtaining a commission in either 
the IIome or Indian Reserve, will presumably, in most cases, 
amount to four months only. 
The manner in which this period of four months may be 
occupied will unquestionably have a most vital influence on the 
efficiency of reserve officers as  a, whole. The first and most 
natural assumption would be that each candidate should, during 
this four months, be schooled in military work with the unit in 
which he aspired to eventually hold a commission ri la w i l e .  
There are several points to be considered in  regard to this 
very important subject. 
T h e  responsibility of commanding and other regimental 
officers is already somewhat considerable, in connection with 
the efficiency of the men under their command, most of whom, 
in , the United Kingdom, at any rate, are very young soldiers, 
requiring the utmost amount of careful supervision. 
I t  would seem somewhat doubtful, whether the army as a 
whole would be benefited i f  the attention of regimental officers 
were to be in any degree distracted from their legitimate work 
by imposing upon them the duty of schooling an indefinite 
number of candidates for the reserve. 
The one aim and object of every commanding officer, and 
of those who assist him, -should bc to raise to, and maintain his 
command at the highest possible pitch of military perfection; 
and the less his  attention is distracted from that aim-as it 
certainly would be, if he were compelled to school reserve candi- 
dates against time-the more possible its attainment becomes. 
The instruction of aspirants to the reserve must, owing to 
the limited time v-hich will be available, be carefully graduated 
and carried through, under very high pressure, and might, 
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under such conditions, be anything but advantagcous to the 
battalion or regiment to which they might be attached. 
On the other hand, i t  is most desirable that reserve officers 
should have bccn previously associated, i f  possible, with those 
with whom they would have to co-opcrate on’emergency, and 
should, generally, be familiar with the amenities and routine 
of reginiental life. 
‘I‘o meet all requirements it is suggested that schools of 
instruction for reserve candidates should be established on some- 
what similar lines to the Guards’ School for Oficers of 
Auxiliary Forces at Chelsea. The course at  the latter admirable 
institution has hitlierto been limited to one month only. The 
courses at the proposed scliools for reserve officers of infantry 
should extend to three months, and might, therefore, be of a 
much more comprehensive and extended character than that at 
Chelsea. 
Candidates from School and University Corps would rarely 
be possessed of any practical knowledge of cavalry or field 
artillery; and, hence, i t  is probable that the duration of the 
courses of instruction at Reserve Officers’ Schools for those 
arms might have to be prolonged beyond the limit  of three 
months.’ 
T h e  instructors a t  institutions of the kind suggested would 
exist for one purpose, and for one purpose only, viz., the 
training in the best possible way of the students passing through 
their.hands. 
I t  can hardly be doubted that the instruction of a particular 
class of individuals, such as reserve officers, could be better 
carried on in establishments especially designed for the purpose, 
rather than with regiments or battalions, the commanders and 
officers of yhich have to bear on their shoulders the weight of 
other and, perhaps, antagonistic rcsponsibilities. 
After thus undergbing a sufficiently arduous course, candi- 
dates might complete their labours and gain a practical insight 
into regimental life and interior economy, by serving for one 
month with thc particular unit to which, after receiving their 
commissions, they hoped to belong, Ci la suite. British officers 
have been accustomed to regard themselves, to some .extent, 
as military “Jacks of all trades,” and, no doubt, to ihe great 
advantage of the Service, have been always ready in  emergency 
to do duty in  any capacity-with transport or mounted infantry 
-with machine g u n s  or the supply department. 
In the case of reserve officers, it would seem to be unreason- 
able to expect the same versatility; and, hence, i t  would be well, 
i f  their eficiency is to be secured, that they should be 
encouraged to specialise, as far as  possible; in other words, 
1 A  candidatc for hn Infantry Commission, who had’not served for 
the prescribed period, both with a School and with a University Corps, 
would also bc requircd to go through an cxtendcd course at a Reserve 
School. 
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each reservist should be taught to regard himself as an infantry- 
man, or as  a cavalryman, o r  as an artilleryman, or as a trans- 
portman, pure and simple, and nothing more. 
The reservist having completed his preliminary training, 
and having been granted his commission as a second-lieutenant, 
would naturally’pass into civil life, and the question must now 
be considered as to how his knowledge and military spirit could 
best be kept up to the mark, without unduly encroaching o n  the 
-time which he must devote to the vocation by which he would 
be making a living. It will not be forgotten that the lack of 
any ‘pre+sisting ‘system of periodic training caused incon- 
venience with the retired professional officers, who constituted 
the reserve during the Boer War,  and would be even more 
severely .felt by somewhat hastily-trained young men, who were 
not professional soldiers. 
The idea of an annual Refresher Course ” . a t  once 
presents itself as a simple solution of the difficulty. Now, so 
far as I can discover, it has not been customary, evcn with those 
.nations which. enforce compulsory service, to call on .reserve 
officers to rejoin the colours ever year; the courses orf instruc- 
tion are usually only biennial, & r i n g  the earliest stages of a 
reservist’s existence; and as years roll by, the call is appa’ren’tly 
‘made as infrequently as once in four years. If such care for 
individual convcniencc is.displayed by Governments, who have 
absolute power over their citizens, it would be wise, perhaps, 
to display equal leniency in this country; and to, therefore, only 
compel each reservist to present himself for 15 days’ training 
once in two years. ’ 
All subaltern officers should be encouraged to come out 
every year; and those who enrolled themselves in the first 
category, as being always ready for military duty, should,, of 
course, be compelled to, attend annual trainings; such annual 
trainings taking place, either with the uni t s  to which they 
belonged, or with,a  Reserve Training School. Officers, who 
might elect to come out for training once in two years only, 
should be compelled to always undergo their course at a School 
of Instruction, the work at whicli would be carried through on 
mucti severer lines than with a battalion or regiment. 
Regiments serving in India are composed of comparatively 
old soldiers, their establishments are higher than those of units 
at home, and the number of reserve officers to be trained would 
be very limited, hence it is possible that the necessary instruc- 
tion might be imparted regimentally, the formation of ‘Indian 
Reseive Training Schools being thus obviated. 
All ‘reserve second-lieutenants should. be eligible for pro- 
motion ‘to the’rarik of lieutenant, after three years’ service; and 
subalterns of the first category should be eligible to be captains 
after g years’ service, those of the second category after 12. 
As an ample supply of senior reserve officers can be 
obtained from the pensioned officers of the Regular Army, it 
would probably be possible to dispense with the services of 
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officers recruited from other sources after 15' years' service. 
Those who had rendered thoroughly satisfactory service, and 
who had completed a certain period in the first category, might 
be eligible for the rank 01 major on retirement. 
THE CASE OF RESERVE OFFICERS WHO HAVE SERVED ,IN THE 
REGULAR ARMY AND THEIR PROBABLE POSITION 
IN THE FUTURE. 
TVhen the reserve was called out in 1899-1900, some officers 
appeared to have forgotten their military knowledge, and had 
apparently c&scd to regard themklves as soldiers,' hlilitary 
science- .advances rapidly in the present day, and an '  oficer, 
after a few y&rs' absence-from the army, if no opportunity 
i s ,  afforded him of keeping his knowledge up to 'the mark, is 
apt to display an ignorance which is injurious to the service, 
and disconcerting to the 'individual. 
The  advantage o f ,  keeping' reserve officers in touch with 
the ,Service, i - a s  well demonstrated in 1899-1906; for those who 
had previously, of their own free will, served with, the Auxiliary 
Forces, fell ' into their places on' recall 'with much greater 
facility than their colleagues v h o  had been -leading ' a purely 
civilian life. , 
It is customary in  'most Continenjal countries, not to 
compel men of 32 years of'age and 'upwards to undergo train- 
ing .in & n e  of peace; but reserve officers of middle. age are 
encouraged to do so. 
This policy might be followed in dealing with the retired 
military men now serving in' the reserve. These' latter should 
be allowed to'train with a un i t  for'fifteen days once in two 
years.' 
I t  would be of trifling cost to the State, and would remove 
all reasonable ground for discontent, if officers in receipt of 
retired pay were, in addition thereto, to be granted the full 
pay and allowances of their rank when serving either for a 
" refresher course ". or for permanent duty in  an emergency. 
A great stimulus to exertion would also be afforded i f  it were 
to be officially decreed that reserve officers of this class, attend- 
ing .  regularly for periodical instruction, and eshibiting zeal 
and proficiency when so doing, should be considered eligible 
for a step of rank by brevet, after each,'period of ten years 
spent in the reserve; such advancement being irrespective of, 
and additional to, any promotion which might be conferred in 
respect of special service performed in an emergency. 
I t  has been pointed out that the subalterns of a re-organised 
reserve would necessarily be brought in  many cases into close 
1Tlic " refrcshcr courscs " of those destined .to hold position on thc 
Stafi would take place in the office, over which, on ;I rnobilisation, they 
would be cilled upon to preside. 
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contact with the retired military men, who would constitute the 
bulk,of the field oflicers and captains, and might-and probably 
would-be influenced by their example. It is most ,desirable, 
therefore, that every precaution should be taken to secure the 
efficiency of these latter officers. 
THE DANGER OF YOUNG MEN BEING TEMPTED TO JOIN THE 
AUXILIARY FORCES. 
If entirely new sources of supply are tapped, as already 
suggested, for. the. reserve,' the risk of the latter organisation 
proving a '  formidable competitor to the Auxiliary Forces or 
new Territorial Army would be very materially reduced. There 
is another consideration involved. The disposition at  present 
appears to be towards placing reserve officers on a diflerent 
footing from their confreres of the Auxiliary Forces. 
An intention has been evinced to treat the former, if not 
with generosity, a t  least with suficient liberality, to guard them 
against, any out-of-pocket expenses in t ime of peace; and if 
this policy is adhered to, it will confer on reserve officers a 
marked pecuniary advantage over the resf of the officers of 
the land forces. 
Under such circumstances it might be not altogether inap- 
propriate if the ,military 'instruction of reservists were to be, 
generally speaking, conducted on' more strenuous lines. than 
are deemed advkable in the case of the'annual camps of the 
Militia, the ,Volunteers, or. the Yeomanry, the officers of which 
usually' suffer considerable pecuniary loss as a-  result of their 
connection' with the army. 
I t  is said that the day's \iork at a Swiss 'Federal School 
mounts . u p  to .g or even 10 hours out of the 24. Without 
attempting to emulate'such a pitch of diligence in this country, 
it, might, be' not '  unreasonable to require a reserve 'officer, in 
view of the fact .that all his espenses wouTd be fully. met by the 
State, .and an ,honorarium also granted to, him, to' devote as 
much ,time, when. engaged in military, work, to the performance 
of his duties a s  would fall to the lot of gentlemen employed in 
any great financial or business house, in London or elsewhere.. 
. . Young men, who join the Auxiliary Forces at consider- 
able personal outlay, although ready a t  all times to carry out 
much good work, without receiving any recognition from the 
bulk of their cou,ntrymen, yet, very naturally, regard the camps 
of their regiments, to some extent, in the light.of annual out- 
ings, during which a considerable, amount, of military duty is 
harmoniously blended with occupations of a . less arduous 
character. 
It is improbable that officers of this stamp would, generally 
speaking, forego the undoubted social pleasures of regimental 
life, in favour of joining the Reserve of Officers, even i f  they 
gained considerabry, in a pecuniary sense, by so doing, i f  the 
RESERVE OF OFFICERS IN PREFERENCE TO THE 
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fact was fully recognised, that owing to the limited time avail- 
able, tlie military training of reserve officers must necessarily 
be carried out under very high pressure. 
It is submitted, therefore, that the recruitment of the 
reserve officers would not act injuriously on the  commissioned 
ranks of the Auxiliary Forces, i f  entirely fresh sources of 
supply were tapped for the benefit of the former, and if,  also, 
it were clearly understood that reserve officers, although fully 
recompensed for their services, would be expected in return to 
work extremely hard when undergoing military instruction. 
OBSTACLES ivmcIi MIGIIT DJXER YOUKG AIEN FROM JOINING 
THE RESERVE OF OFFICERS, AND THE BEST NEANS OF 
Before concluding this paper, 'it will be necessary, both 
to review the causes which might deter young men from join- 
i n g  the Reserve of Officers, and to endeavour to suggest means 
for their removal. Such antagonistic influences might have 
their origin, in some instances, in. a perhaps not altogether 
unintelligible dislike to incurring pecuniary loss, in addition to 
personal responsibility . 
In many cases, however, they would probably arise from 
that extraordinary indifference to, and ignorance of, military 
matters, ,\vhich is very prevalent, and which is so remarkable 
as to be aimost astounding.. Considering the vital importance 
to every man of the safety of the Empire, it is difficult to realise 
the indifference to the whole subject which is freely displayed 
by thousands of educated persons. 
Broadly speaking; the Lana Forces of the Crown, however 
designated, must necessarily range themselves into two main 
classes, composed: the first, of those who are professional 
soldiers; the Second,' of those who, being employed in military 
work for but a' few.dais or weeks in the year, are civilians first 
and soldiers afterwards. Reserve officers, like those of the 
Auxiliary. Forces, .obi4ously belong to tlie second class, and 
many of the influences, therefore, which prevent ,young men 
from accepting commissions in the Auxilihry , Forces would, 
presumably, militate against their joining the reserve. 
A careful, esamination of all available evidence points to 
the conclusion that the causes which have hitherto checked the 
flow of recruit oficers to the AIilitia, Yeomanry, and Volun- 
teers are as follows :- 
REMOVING T H E M .  
I .  Dread of incurring espense. 
2. 
3. Indifference to military matters. 
4: Dislike to anything connected with the army. 
Fear that the calls of military duty might interfere 
with vocations in civil life. 
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THE DREAD OF I K C U R R I X G  EXPENSE. 
Inability or unwillingness to incur pecuniary loss is 
probably the most potent, and is certainly the most reasonable, 
of the deterrents which collectively prevent young men from 
accepting commissions. 
Major-General Sir  Alfred Turner, K.C.B., speaking with 
some years’ esperience as Director-General of Auxiliary l‘orces, 
informed the Norfolk Commission, with special rcference to 
the deficiency of oficers of the Auxiliary Forces, that they 
could get excellent officers “from the poorer classcs of pro- 
fessional and other men, who cannot join because of the 
espense. If the country chose to give them money to cover 
all their espenscs, \ve should get a large number of oficcrs.” 
Sir Alfred ’Turner added: “ I f  we can pay we shall get what 
we want.” 
It will be remembered that a somewhat similar view was 
espressed before the South African \\Tar Commission by Major- 
General H. C. Borrett, C.B., who had also had experience as 
Director-General of Auxiliary Forces. 
I propose to discuss the question of expense from a some- 
what homely standpoint, which, I trust, may not be deemed 
unworthy of the dignity of the subject. 
For some years the writer, being -intimately associated 
with a certain uni t  of the Ausiliary Forces, had occasion to 
observe that’ it frequently happened that zealous and efficient 
officers of the Corps, having entered into the State of AIatri- 
mony, shortly afterwards ,resigned their commissions. 
On being asked their reasons for so doing, they almost 
invariably replied that their wives did not wish them to serve 
on. 
Being keenly interested in the subject, I ventured in several 
cases to approach the ladies whose influence was causing loss 
to the Service. 
I n  the first instance, I was usually put off with the remark 
that they did not like to give up the society of their husbands 
on Saturday afternoons, or for the week of the annual camp. 
I pressed on each lady’s attention, with, I trust ,  not undue 
insistence, the fact that alth’ough the Corps might claim a few 
days of her husband’s leisure in the course of the year, yet that 
there were social functions connected with the Officers Mess 
which could hardly fail to be agreeable to any lady, and which 
might, therefore, be taken into her consideration ; and I further 
ventured to point to the calls of patriotism. The reply I 
invariably received may be summarised as  follows :- 
‘‘ W e  are not rich people, and are obliged, therefore, to 
make our income go as far as possible. M y  husband’s out-of- 
pocket espenses annually, in connection with the Volunteers, 
wouId be sufficient to defray the cost of a trip to the seaside, or 
some other little lusury, in which we could both1 participate, 
and which, i f  he were to serve on, we should be compelled to 
forego. As for patriotism, why should my husband be 
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expected to give both his t ime and his money for die public 
benefit, and thus oblige us both to practise a certain amount 
of self-denial, whilst our  friends Alr. A and Alr .  B, who are 
far better off pecuniarily, have never done a day’s militar 
duty, nor voluntarily subscribed a penny to the Volunteers? 
Arguments these, to which, under the circumstances, it 
was somewhat difficult to furnish an euective reply. The 
inference to be drawn, however, from all this, is, that if the 
pecuniary allowances in connection with the Auxiliary Forces 
were sufficient to cover all outgoing expenses, not only would the 
number of applicants for commissions be greater than at present, 
but the number of resignations would be considerably less. 
T h e  question of supplying officers for the Auxiliary Forces 
is beyond the scope of this Essay, and i t  is only necessary to 
debate the matter, in so far as it throws light on the probable 
difficulties, in the way of the recruitment of the reserve. The 
arguments which might be adduced by an anxious wife against 
service in the latter, might be even harder to combat than 
those quoted above, for reserve officers would, to some extent, 
bc debarred from the pleasant social amenities, which, in  some 
cases at any rate, are an undoubted attraction to the Auxiliary 
Forces, and, moreover, they might be called upon to abandon 
their civil pursuits at great pecuniary loss for a prolonged 
period, in order to perform military duty at some distant dep6t. 
It is doubtless the case that officers of Ausiliary Forces are 
liable to be called out for military duty in the same manner 
as  officers of the rescrye. As a matter of fact, however, the 
Yeomanry and Volunteers have never for a century been 
mobilised as a body for permanent service, and the probability 
of such a call on their patriotism being made is not very great. 
The Reserve of Officers, on the contrary, has been required 
to perform a prolonged spell of military duty within very recent 
years, and it is not difficult to conceive that another such call 
might be made upon it in the fuiure. The liability which 
attaches to a reserve officer, therefore, is obviously of a more 
serious character than that of his confrbres of the Ausiliary 
Forces. 
If, to fi l l  the commissioned ranks of the lattcr, it would be 
necessary to grant suficient allowances to cover all out-of- 
pocket espenses, the inference would appear to be that to draw 
sufficient candidates to the less attractivc reserve, something 
more would be necessary, viz., the prospect of direct pecuniary 
ad vantage. 
It has already been suggested that the senior reservc 
officers, most of whom are professional soldiers, should be 
granted the pay and allowances of their rank, when called out 
for duty. In the case of tLe subalterns and junior captains of 
the reserve, and aspirants thereto, whd would be practically 
civilians, a different system of remuneration might be more 
appropriate. 
x 
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One of the greatest of disciplinarians, General Sir Charles 
Napier, has left on record his opinion that nothing so readily 
produces an undisciplined feeling of discontent as any uncer- 
tainty as  to the exact amount of the remuneration to which 
each individual of an army is entitled. 
I n  civil employment, to which reserve subalterns would be 
accustomed, each man usually receives a certain inclusive 
stipend. To prevent misunderstanding, with the resulting dis- 
contenf, some similar system of payment might be adran- 
tageously followed with reservists, during their occasional tours 
of military duty, and their four months' preliminary training. 
Instead of their salary being niade up, as is the case nith 
Regular OfIiccrs, of various small s u m s  respectively, represent- 
i n g  pay, and allowances for light, coal, lodgings, messing, 
travelling, etc., it would be well if each rcservc subaltern could 
be paid a consolidated salary, for every day or week of military 
duty. The amount of such salary should be such that on a 
reasonable computation, it would cover all expenses whatever, 
and in case of officers required for duty with the mounted 
branches of the army, it should be proportionately increased. 
Arrangements might also be made to provide young officers 
on joining the reserve with their entire military outfit, free of 
cost, i f  they undertook to serve for a certain number of years, 
from the Army. Clothing Department, and any changes of 
pattern from time to time officially ordered, should also be 
executed at the same establishment, at  the public expense. 
Lastly, an annual retaining fee should be given to every 
reservist not in'receipt of retired pay. \Vhat the amount of 
such a fee should be is a matter of considerable importance, 
and is one concerning which any private individual can only 
speak with hesitancy. 
The replies to enquiries, which I have ventured to address 
to civilians, whose opinions might be of value, lead to the belief 
that, in the case of gentlemen, who might elect to register their 
names for inclusion in the first category of the reserve, a fairly 
substantial honorarium, say A40 a year, might be necessary; 
for those who preferred the mitigated responsibility of the 
second category, a smaller annual retaining fee, say A20, would 
probably suffice.* . 
I t  is submitted that the treatment to be meted out to reserve 
officers, from a financial point of view, should be such that 
young men and their parents, and guardians also, should feel 
confident that the acceptance of the responsibilities of a com- 
mission-and those responsibilities might, it should be remem- 
bered, eventually prove to be somewhat onerous-far from in- 
volvinE any outlay, would actually be the source of a slight 
immediate increase of income, the amount of such increase 
I I t  is a mattcr for.gravc considcration whether such retaining fecs 
ought not to be 'continued to officers,.as some slight addition to a " living 
wage," when they arc callcd out in crncrgcncy. 
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being augmentable, at  the option of each individual officer, by 
the assumption of greater liability to active service on registra- 
tion for the first category. For reasons which have been 
already stated, it would probably be unnecessary, generally 
speaking, to detain officers after they had completed about 15 
years in the reserve. On  relegation to private life, however, 
those individuals, who had rendered good service, and who 
had.been included in the first category, for any considerable 
period might be,granted a gratuity of Arm. Such a concession 
would tend to induce men to stay on with the reserve, as long 
as their services were required. Similar advantages to those 
indicated above should 6e held out to young men residing in  
India, as an inducement to join the Indian Army Reserve. 
As fully explained in Part I . ,  any uncertainty as to con- 
ditions of service is apt to 'lead to misunderstandings, fruitful  
in discontent and inimical 'to zeal and efficiency. The regula- 
tions governing the rates of remuneration, and all pecuniary 
and other advantages of reserve officers, should, therefore, be 
embodied in  a Single publication, in the simplest possible form, 
so that no reasonable justification for' any misconception could 
exist. 
FEAR THAT' THE CALLS OF ~ I I L I T A R Y  DUTY MIGHT INTERFERE 
WITH VOCATIONS IN CIVIL LIFE. 
Parents and guardians, who are in ' no  way' inimical to the 
army a s  a profession, and who would gladly assist any young 
man they were interested in, "to' gain a commission in  the 
Regular .'Army, arb' often disposed to look askance at the 
Auxiliary Forces. Such.persons are apt to express the opinion 
that i f  a youth.has military hstes, he should by all means be 
encouraged to become-a soldier by profession; but they stead- 
fastly set their faces against,'what they very erroneously term, 
at  soldiers," in other words, against service in 'the 
A1 ili  t ia,' %eoman ry; ' or Volunteers; 
The  Reserve of Offcers ivould certain1 fall under the ban 
of any person'imbu'ed with sentiments o Y this kind, and to 
trace, as far as possible, the origin'of such ideas, and to investi- 
gate the means by which they might be combated,' is within 
the scope,'thcrefore, of this Essay. A firm belief is held in 
some quarters,' and by men whose opinion is worthy of respect, 
that the glitter and.display, which throw a glamour over mili- 
tary life, might' tend with' some young' men to divert their 
attention from, and make them discontented with existence 
amidst' more prosaic surroundings. 
'This belief has a certain amount of support in the unfor- 
tunate fact that 'a' fei\.-a very fd\ir-cases are, from time to time, 
to be metwith, in which officers of Ausiliary Forces, forgetting 
that they 'are civilians first,' and soldiers afterwards, have 
allowed their devotion to 'military work, to undermine, to-some 
extent; 'their zeal for the 'calling:' or' profession, by which they 
playin I 1  
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earn their living, with the undoubtedly deplorable result, that  
their advancement in the latter has, to some estent, suffered. 
Now, i t  is useless, by way of. argument, to point to the 
infrequency of such cases, for the reply is immediately evoked 
that, granting that the danger is small, it still unquestionably 
exists; and as there is no neccssity for a youth, destined for 
civil life in this country, to dabble with military matters, he 
had much better avoid so doing, and thus keep clcar of all risk. 
I t  is possible that, in many cases, where these arguments 
are put forward, the individual us ing  them is rendered more 
obstinate by a n  unacknowledged fear, l u rk ing  in the back- 
ground, that any connection with the Auxiliary Forces will 
mean heavy out-of-pocket expense. 
A general conviction, however, that disturbing influences 
from an association with things military, are apt to react on 
civil pursuits, undoubtedly exists, and must, therefore, be taken 
into account. 
I n  an article, published in the ‘I Nineteenth Century ” for 
November, 1906, entitled, ‘I A Liberal’s Plea for Compulsory 
Service,” is given the results of eshaustive enquiries, made 
personally i n  Switzerland, by the author of the article, with 
special reference to the subject of military training. 
The great preponderance of opinion in the Republic 
a p p r s  ’to hold that the moral effect of the short course of 
barrack and camp life, which is universally enforced, is, on 
the whole, escellent. The great majority of parents have no 
anxieties about barrack life, beyond those inseparable from the 
age of the recruits (20), and their first entry into the world, 
whilst the discipline is universally recognised as a n  important 
factor in i he  national education. . . . Nearly an my  
informants,” adds the writer of the article, ‘I were parents 
whose sons were, or had been, in the army, and such regrets 
as  I heard were from those who had had a son rejected. Several 
said outright, that  quite apart from military reasons, they would 
gladly send their sons to the barracks, simply as a healthy 
introduction to the school of life.” 
From which it would seem that a limited cxperience of 
military life is not regarded, in Switzerland at; any rate, as 
antagonistic to subsequent success in other callings. 
It has already been explained that the system of instruction 
at  the Swiss Federal Schools for military training, is con- 
ducted on somewhat severe lines, and it is permissible to 
suggest that military lore, imparted under such high pressure, 
may be by no means‘wlculated to distract the youthful mind 
from civil pursuits, and that men, who have been disciplined 
in  a sufficiently strict school, will be all the better citizens a f t e r  
wards. No establishments could be devised which could afTord 
better training in every respect for young men than is to be 
obtained in any unit of the Regular Army. As already 
explained, however, the interests of the service might suffer i f  
regimental authorities, in addition to their other responsibilities, 
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were required to carry out the training of all reserve officers, 
under the high pressure conditions, which would be necessary 
to ensure the.efficicncy of the latter in the limited time that 
would be available. 
The general public also are sometimes disposed to base 
their ideas of regimental life on the glimpses which they obtain 
a t  moments when officers are indulging in well-earned relaxa- 
tion, and oblivious of the professional drudgery, which the 
latter must necessarily be obliged to perform, civilians in many 
cases, harbour a ridiculous belief that military life, in peace 
time a t  any rate, is so easy and so pleasant, that any young 
man, who has been permitted to share in its delights for any 
length of time, will be afterwards unfitted for settling down 
in any other profession. Nonsensical as this belief is, yet it 
is possible that i f  the regulations for reserve officers were framed 
with complete disregard for it, a certain number of parents and 
guardians might be rendered antagonistic to the reserve. 
I t  would seem, thercforc, that in the best interests, both of 
Regular units of the army, and of the reserve itself, the 
members of the latter should be trained in special schools; those 
reserve officers destined for regimental duty in emergency being 
required, after passing through a school, to spend a few weeks 
with the unit to which it was intended to attach them Ci la suite, 
with a view to their gaining some insight into regimental life 
and routine. If the schools for reserve officers in the United 
Kingdom were organised on a somewhat similar system to that 
which prevails in Switzerland, it is, perhaps, not too much to 
hope that a similar belief to that which prevails in Switzerland 
might also gradually impregnate the minds of British parents 
and guardians; and. we might witness the destruction in this 
country of the absurd and mischievous doctrine, that simply 
because'a man is sufficiently trained to arms to stand u p  in 
defence of his native land in the hour of danger, .therefore, he 
has been rendered in any way unfitted for entire success ir 
every-day life. 
INDIFFERENCE TO hlILITARY hIATTERS. 
There is a large body of men whose motto appears to be, 
" The cobbler should stick to his last." Th'is attitude, on the 
question of national defence, can best be described by my quot- 
ing the remarks of a wealthy manufacturer from one of the 
hlidland centres of industry, whose acquaintance I recently 
made. This gentleman incidentally referred, in a disparaging 
manner, to a near relation of his own, who was a distinguished 
member of the Volunteer Army. 
I ventured to expostulate with him, and pointed out that 
the Volunteers were rendering good service to their country. 
To this my friend replied, that he had a great belief in prcl 
fessional ability, but placed little or no  reliance in amateurs. 
If the navy and army, who were professional fighters, could 
VOL. LII. 2 u  
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not secure the safety of tlie British Empire. he was quite .certain 
that the Alilitia and Volunteers would not save the situation. 
If the Regular Army werc not large enough, its number'bl 
should be increased, ,and the extra cost might casily be saved 
by the disbandment of the whole of the Ausiliaries 1 
T o  these theories the worthy man adhered, in the face of 
all argument, with unshakeable firmness, finally bringing the 
discussion to a close with the remark that for civilians to intrude 
themselves as amateurs into the military world, which they 
did i f  they became Volunteers, was just as likely to lead to 
disaster as if a professional soldier were to come into his factory 
and endeavour to work it according to military ideas. 
Unfortunately, this gentleman, who, i t  is to be feared, is 
b no means alone in his ideas, sprung from an intelligent 
might be drawn, if not debarred therefrom by narr0.w-minded 
prejudice, and by an incapacity for appreciating 'the needs of 
the Empire. 
The only possible means of uprooting such theories would 
seem,to bc to attack them at the earliest stages of existence, and 
to endeavour ,to inculcate the principles of patriotism and devo- 
tion to the national ideal, .in the minds. of the pupils, of all 
grammar a,nd .middle-class schools, on .  the lines which will be 
advocated anon in - t h e  case of Elementary Schools. T o  
inaugurate such a reform in the national, system of education, 
the hearty sympath and support of the scholastic ,profession is 
essential, and as a l rst step in  securing this, every: cffort should 
be made to develop S i r  Ian Hamilton's suggestion, and school- 
masters of. all grades ,should be encouraged by every possible 
means to accept commissions i,n the reserve, and thus to identify 
the teaching profession as a body with the principle that the 
first and most sacred duty of a citizen is to qualify himself to 
bear a share in the defence'of the Empire. 
' 
c r ass, from which admirable recruits for the Reserve of Officers 
THE DISLIKE TO i-\NYT€iIh'G CONNECTED IYITII TIIE t\RhlY. 
I now approach the last and most deplorable of the 
influences, antagonistic to military service, which esist in this 
country . 
The theories and opinions tending in the same direction, 
which have been sketched in the preceding pages, although to 
be regretted, can, generally speaking, be supported by argu- 
ments which, although perhaps misguided, are a t  least not 
absolutely devoid of reason. 
The school of thought, uhich declaims against all military 
training, on the ground that i t  fosters the brutal'instincts of 
mankind, and which' holds the theory that, the .safety .of the 
Empire can. be maintained by relying .on the goodwill of. our 
Continental 'rivals,' would appear to be beyond the reach of, any 
aig  u m en t . 
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Fortunately, tllose imbued with peace-at-any-price-theories 
are ,  in a minority in this country, but this. minority is active 
and persistent, and frequently makes its influence felt; moreover, 
the members of it usually belong to a certain.social stratum, 
from yhich reserve officers are, to a large extent, obtained in 
foreigmarmies, and from which they also might be obtained in 
this country if existing prejudices could be stamped out. 
Peace-at-any-price sentiments arc, generally speaking, the 
heritage of a prosperous middle age, and do not, as a rule, find 
a place in youthful minds. The undermining of these, as of 
other prejudices opposed to the safety of the Empire, can best 
be attempted during the early stages of life; and i f  the principles 
of patriotism were a constituent part of the curriculum of every 
school in the kingdom, here, as  elsewhere, anti-military prejudice 
would eventually be uprooted. 
Elementary Schools, being supported by public money, 
should be required, as a condition of receiving such endowment, 
to devote a certain fixed time to instruction in the duties of 
citizenship. By enforcing such a system, we should but be 
following the example of the great nations of the world. 
Nothing appears to have more' impressed the members of 
the Rloseley Commission, most of whom were teachers from Great 
Britain and Ireland, than the spectacle of thousands of American 
children salutingthe national flag at.the regular school assembly. 
In Japan' the youthful mind. is saturated in the 'hours .of 
school ivith the cardinal virtues of loyalty to the Emperor, 
patriotism;and filial piety, and a like path must,be trodden in 
this'country, i f  those 'individualistic theories' are to' be swept 
away, which'are antagonistic to' national security. 
RECAPITULATION. 
\Ve h'ave- seen that,: in the view of the most eminent 
authorities, a dangerous deficiency ' .at  present. exists in the 
number of trained officers available to meet the demands of any 
,great emergency, by which the British Empire might be con- 
fronted;'that officers are the one adjunct of an army , which it 
is quite impossible to improvise; that the existing Reserve of 
Oficers was'entirely 'inadequate to meeting the strain, of the 
war in '  South Africa, 'and when called out,, developed, defects, 
which are apparent1 inherent to its present organisatjori. 
ing deficiency have been proposed, yet the.yeight of expert 
.opinion inclines to the, belief that an entirely satisfactory solu- 
tion of the difficulty'could only be reached by ' inducing a 
sufficient number of educated y o u ~ g  men, both to qualify them- 
selves for ,the reserve, 'by passing rapidly through the army, 
and, tq'kcep' up, their knowledge' of military science aft,( their 
restoration' t o  civil life; I by periodic returns to the: colours ; a 
system being inaugurated in this country, as#'similar as adherence 
to the voluntary system will permit. to those.which..p;evail in 
2 u 2  
W e  have seen t I: at, although certain palliati.ves for the exist- 
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Germany, in Japan, in the so-called Regular Army of Switzer- 
land, and, in fact, in most civilised countries. W e  have seen 
that, although no better leaders of men than our present officers 
could be found, yet it is scarcely possible to hope that a reserve 
mustering thousands could be recruited from the same class ; that 
distinguished generals, having exceptional opportunities for 
forming an opinion on this subject, have suggested that it would 
be desirable to tap fresh sources of supply, gentlemen being 
attracted therefrom by the knowledge that if they are sufficiently 
patriotic to sacrifice their leisure for the public good, they will 
not be required, in addition, to suffer financially, their zeal 
being accorded an adequate pecuniary recognition ; and that such 
a widening of the area of recruitment might not improbably 
prevent the requirements of the Reserve of Officers from clash- 
i n g  injuriously with the supply of young men for the commis- 
sioned ranks of other parts of the land forces. 
An endeavour has been made to formulate a scheme which 
may, as far as  possible, be in consonance with the opinions 
weightily expressed before the South. African \Var Commission 
and before the Norfolk Commission. 
A rough sketch has been drawn of arrangements which 
might prove feasible for the recruitment, clothing, training, 
promotion, and remuneration of a reconstituted reserve; and 
proposals have been made, having for their object the mitigation 
of hardship on a’call to arms. The  special qualifications, which 
should be possesscd by officers destined for duty with native 
troops in India, have not been lost sight of. I t  has been 
suggested that, in order that the requisite knowledge might he 
reaped in the limited time which would be available, reserve 
officers should be required to work under very high pressure 
when called out for military duty; that, as it would be rather 
difficult to give instruction under such a system with un i t s  at 
home, special training schools should be established for the 
benefit of reservists, the latter, as explained above, being suitably 
remunerated in recognition of their strenuous exertions, and 
that only Indian Reserve Officers should be trained regimentally. 
The officially recognised maxim, that good service in School 
and University Volunteer Corps, should be acknowledged by 
partial mitigation of the period of qualification for a Reserve 
Commission, has been incorporated in the proposed scheme of 
instruction, and details have, as far as appeared practicable, 
been filled in. 
The difficulties which were encountered, when the existing 
reserve was called out in 1899-1902, have been kept steadily in 
view, and the causes of the friction which was created, when the 
reserve officers in Russia were summoned to arms during the 
war with Japan, have been taken into account. 
Lastly, the influences which might be prejudicial to the 
recruitment of the reserve, have been reviewed by the light of 
experience, gained both from the Auxiliary Forces and in 
every-day life, and proposals for their removal or abatement 
have, with very considerable,diffidence, been adumbrated. 
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CONCLUSION. 
Napoleon has left on record his convictiqn that, without-a 
supply of trained omcers, it is impossible to form an army, and, 
further, that capable. officers cap .only, be obtained. by careful 
education. 
The' overwhelming weight of opinion of those qualified to 
speak with authority, supports the Emperor's dictum. 
The  training and maintenance of a Corps of Officers, 
thoroughly educated and sufficiently numerous,' lies, therefore, 
a t  the root of military efficiency,.and is essential 10 the security 
of any 's ta te .  
In the case of a mighty empire, the majority of the citizens 
of which disdain the aid of compulsory service for the recruit- 
ment of the military fprces, the cost o f  the latter mu'st necessarily 
be.considerable, and as the provisi.on of a supply'of reserve 
officers. can be but .a cqmparatively insignificant addition to 
what' must, under' any circumstances, .be a heavy pecuniary 
burden,' it would seem unnecessary to dilate on the question of 
espense. 
No attempt has, therefore, been made ,in the, foregoing 
pages to estimate the pecuniary outlay.which might be necessary 
to carry out the suggestions which have been put, forward.. 
T h e  creat'ion and maintenance of a reserve of ~p,ddg thor- 
ou hly.efficient ,officers ,must, in any country, be a Herculean 
United Kingdom, to individual liberty, increases ipmeasurably 
the difficulties of the .operation., I t  would, seem, .therefore, 
possible that ' n'o system of reasonable pecuni,ary .induceme,nt 
would alone suffice to %entirely conquer these difficulties, and 
unaided, call into existence such an organisation in connection, 
with the British Army; and, hence, that a Reserve of Omcers, 
like many other requisites to the national security, could only 
be built up by resting the foundations of our defensive system 
on the bedrock of national life; in other words, by training the 
minds of the young in the duties of citizenship. 
I t  is urged in some quarters that British parents w-ould not 
tolerate the inoculation of their offspring with the spirit of 
militarism; but surely this taboo, if i t  indeed exists, does not 
embrace also the spirit of patriotism 3 
Gibbon has eloquently told that the Roman Empire reached 
its highest pitch of splendour because '' the fidelity of the citizens 
to each other and to the State was confirmed by the habits of 
education and the prejudices of religion. Honour as well as 
virtue was the principle of the Republic " ; and that, a s  this 
lofty ideal was gradually abandoned, so did material prosperity 
forsake an empire, which, 2,000 years ago, was second only in' 
importance to the vast congeries of States, which to-day recog- 
nise the supremacy of Great Britain. 
The  moral of the " Decfine and Fall of the Roman Empire " 
should be impressed on the mind of every child, and should be 
tas a .; but the,scr.upuIous respcct, which. is.always shown. in the, 
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illustrated by object lessons, :drawn both from the histories of 
the decayin nationalities of to-day, and from the magnificent 
advance of fapan. 
The  rising generation should.thus be taught to realise the 
reat fact that the birthright of every citizen of the British 
Empire, and the independence and wealth inherited ,from our 
forefathers, can only .be maintained if  each individual is pre- 
pared to sacrifice a small portion at  least of his or her ease and. 
convenience for the general ~ . e a l .  
An eminent educationalist, Mr. Ernest Gray, ex-President 
of the National Union of Teachers, when recently speaking with 
reference to ( (  Teaching Imperially,” is reported to have drawn 
a gloomy picture of the parochialism of the elementary skhool- 
masters in London, many of whom,” he declared, “.have never 
been outs,ide the parishes in which they were born.” 
If gentlemen engaged in  the teaching profession were 
encouraged to accept commissions in the reserve, it is probable 
that much of this parochialism would disappear ; , whilst the 
importation .of a new interest into the lives of a parti,cularIy 
hard-working class of men, would tend to distract their thoughts 
from professional cares, during their ,  wellearned hours of 
leisure, and would thus make them all the better able to perform 
their duties as educationalists. 
If it were also decreed that no school, of whatever, grade or 
denomination’, would receive the slightest assistance, direct or 
indirect, from the State, unless in’struction i n  the principles ’of 
patriotism was’ installed as a .  regular subject‘ in.‘ the school 
curriculum, , i t  is submitted that the ‘difficulties to which..Lord 
Roberts and other eminent men have testified, would melt away, 
1‘ like snow before a summer sun,’! and less than a decade’would 
suffice, for the creation of a Reserve of 10,000 Officers, endoived 
with a zeal and efficiency beyon’d reproach. 
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